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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-338811</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338811</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-338811</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338811</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-57079</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-57079</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Net::BitTorrent versions before 2.1.0 for Perl write files outside the download directory via path traversal in peer-supplied metadata.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Net::BitTorrent validates file path components only on the .torrent-file ingest path. The peer and magnet metadata path (_on_metadata_received, reached from the BEP09 ut_metadata extension) passes attacker-supplied file names straight to Storage::add_file and Storage::_parse_file_tree, where Path::Tiny&amp;#39;s child() does not collapse &amp;#34;..&amp;#34;. A v2 file tree key, a v1 files[].path element, or a single-file name containing &amp;#34;..&amp;#34; segments therefore resolves outside the download directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the peer also controls the piece hashes and the served bytes, content verification passes, so a malicious magnet or peer writes attacker-chosen content to an attacker-chosen path on the downloading host.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Net::BitTorrent versions before 2.1.0 for Perl write files outside the download directory via path traversal in peer-supplied metadata.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Net::BitTorrent validates file path components only on the .torrent-file ingest path. The peer and magnet metadata path (_on_metadata_received, reached from the BEP09 ut_metadata extension) passes attacker-supplied file names straight to Storage::add_file and Storage::_parse_file_tree, where Path::Tiny&amp;#39;s child() does not collapse &amp;#34;..&amp;#34;. A v2 file tree key, a v1 files[].path element, or a single-file name containing &amp;#34;..&amp;#34; segments therefore resolves outside the download directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the peer also controls the piece hashes and the served bytes, content verification passes, so a malicious magnet or peer writes attacker-chosen content to an attacker-chosen path on the downloading host.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-57079</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-5gfq-2rx4-6vwv</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5gfq-2rx4-6vwv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.0.1 for Perl write files outside the download directory via path traversal in peer-supplied metadata.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Net::BitTorrent validates file path components only on the .torrent-file ingest path. The peer and magnet metadata path (_on_metadata_received, reached from the BEP09 ut_metadata extension) passes attacker-supplied file names straight to Storage::add_file and Storage::_parse_file_tree, where Path::Tiny&amp;#39;s child() does not collapse &amp;#34;..&amp;#34;. A v2 file tree key, a v1 files[].path element, or a single-file name containing &amp;#34;..&amp;#34; segments therefore resolves outside the download directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the peer also controls the piece hashes and the served bytes, content verification passes, so a malicious magnet or peer writes attacker-chosen content to an attacker-chosen path on the downloading host.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.0.1 for Perl write files outside the download directory via path traversal in peer-supplied metadata.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Net::BitTorrent validates file path components only on the .torrent-file ingest path. The peer and magnet metadata path (_on_metadata_received, reached from the BEP09 ut_metadata extension) passes attacker-supplied file names straight to Storage::add_file and Storage::_parse_file_tree, where Path::Tiny&amp;#39;s child() does not collapse &amp;#34;..&amp;#34;. A v2 file tree key, a v1 files[].path element, or a single-file name containing &amp;#34;..&amp;#34; segments therefore resolves outside the download directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the peer also controls the piece hashes and the served bytes, content verification passes, so a malicious magnet or peer writes attacker-chosen content to an attacker-chosen path on the downloading host.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5gfq-2rx4-6vwv</guid>
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