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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 18:43:41 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-15741</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-15741</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-15741</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-15741</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-375197</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-375197</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-375197</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-375197</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-56736</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-56736</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in versions prior to 4.2.0-alpha allows any unauthenticated user (or low-privileged registered user) to inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes in an administrator&amp;#39;s browser when they review or edit a user-submitted FAQ entry. This leads to admin account takeover via session theft. The vulnerability exists because `html_entity_decode()` converts HTML entities into executable HTML after `strip_tags()` has already passed them through, and the admin template renders the content with Twig&amp;#39;s `|raw` filter without any output sanitization. Version 4.2.0-alpha fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in versions prior to 4.2.0-alpha allows any unauthenticated user (or low-privileged registered user) to inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes in an administrator&amp;#39;s browser when they review or edit a user-submitted FAQ entry. This leads to admin account takeover via session theft. The vulnerability exists because `html_entity_decode()` converts HTML entities into executable HTML after `strip_tags()` has already passed them through, and the admin template renders the content with Twig&amp;#39;s `|raw` filter without any output sanitization. Version 4.2.0-alpha fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-56736</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-pgwp-vc7q-cvj3 — phpMyFAQ has Stored XSS in Admin FAQ Editor via HTML Entity Bypass in Frontend FAQ Submission</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pgwp-vc7q-cvj3</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: thorsten/phpmyfaq, Packagist: phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in phpMyFAQ allows any unauthenticated user (or low-privileged registered user) to inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes in an administrator&amp;#39;s browser when they review or edit a user-submitted FAQ entry. This leads to admin account takeover via session theft. The vulnerability exists because `html_entity_decode()` converts HTML entities into executable HTML after `strip_tags()` has already passed them through, and the admin template renders the content with Twig&amp;#39;s `|raw` filter without any output sanitization.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
**Vulnerable file:** `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/Api/FaqController.php` (lines 109-115)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$answer = Filter::filterVar($data-&amp;gt;answer, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);
if ($this-&amp;gt;configuration-&amp;gt;get(item: &amp;#39;main.enableWysiwygEditorFrontend&amp;#39;)) {
    $answer = trim(html_entity_decode((string) $answer));
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Root cause:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Filter::filterVar()` with `FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS` internally calls `filterSanitizeString()` which applies `strip_tags()` to remove HTML tags. However, `strip_tags()` only removes **actual HTML tag syntax** (e.g., `&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;`) — it does NOT remove **HTML entities** (e.g., `&amp;amp;lt;script&amp;amp;gt;`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `enableWysiwygEditorFrontend` is `true`, `html_entity_decode()` is subsequently called, which converts the surviving HTML entities into real, executable HTML. No server-side HTML sanitizer (such as the Symfony HtmlSanitizer already used elsewhere in the co…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: thorsten/phpmyfaq, Packagist: phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in phpMyFAQ allows any unauthenticated user (or low-privileged registered user) to inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes in an administrator&amp;#39;s browser when they review or edit a user-submitted FAQ entry. This leads to admin account takeover via session theft. The vulnerability exists because `html_entity_decode()` converts HTML entities into executable HTML after `strip_tags()` has already passed them through, and the admin template renders the content with Twig&amp;#39;s `|raw` filter without any output sanitization.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
**Vulnerable file:** `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/Api/FaqController.php` (lines 109-115)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$answer = Filter::filterVar($data-&amp;gt;answer, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);
if ($this-&amp;gt;configuration-&amp;gt;get(item: &amp;#39;main.enableWysiwygEditorFrontend&amp;#39;)) {
    $answer = trim(html_entity_decode((string) $answer));
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Root cause:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Filter::filterVar()` with `FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS` internally calls `filterSanitizeString()` which applies `strip_tags()` to remove HTML tags. However, `strip_tags()` only removes **actual HTML tag syntax** (e.g., `&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;`) — it does NOT remove **HTML entities** (e.g., `&amp;amp;lt;script&amp;amp;gt;`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `enableWysiwygEditorFrontend` is `true`, `html_entity_decode()` is subsequently called, which converts the surviving HTML entities into real, executable HTML. No server-side HTML sanitizer (such as the Symfony HtmlSanitizer already used elsewhere in the co…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pgwp-vc7q-cvj3</guid>
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