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EUVD-2026-362061

fkie_cve-2026-55891

PrivateBin is an online pastebin where the server has zero knowledge of pasted data. Prior to 2.0.5, Request::getRequestUri() in lib/Request.php passes $_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'] through FILTER_SANITIZE_URL, which does not remove quotation marks, angle brackets, or apostrophes, and Controller::_init() stores the attacker-controlled value in Controller::$_urlBase. Controller::_jsonld() in lib/Controller.php then uses str_replace() to insert that value without JSON escaping into js/types.jsonld, js/paste.jsonld, and the other JSON-LD templates used by /?jsonld= and /?pasteid. A raw quotation mark delivered by an HTTP client, proxy, or structured-data crawler that does not normalize the request target can break out of the JSON string and inject arbitrary key-value data into a CORS-open application/ld+json response. The jsonld branch in Controller::__construct() returns before _setCacheHeaders(), so the response also lacks X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, Content Security Policy, X-Frame-Options, and Referrer-Policy. Direct script execution was not demonstrated, but manipulated responses can affect structured-data consumers or combine with less strict clients. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.5.

GHSA-xrjc-c68j-hp7w — PrivateBin has reflected JSON injection in backend responses via unescaped REQUEST_URI

Affected: Packagist: privatebin/privatebin

## Vulnerability Details

A reflected JSON injection allows an attacker to return arbitrary data in the JSON endpoints (like ` /?jsonld=` and `/?pasteid`).

### Root Cause

`Request::getRequestUri()` sanitizes `$_SERVER['REQUEST_URI']` with `FILTER_SANITIZE_URL`:

```php public function getRequestUri() { $uri = array_key_exists('REQUEST_URI', $_SERVER) ? filter_var($_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'], FILTER_SANITIZE_URL) : ''; return empty($uri) ? '/' : $uri; } ```

`FILTER_SANITIZE_URL` does **not** strip `"`, `'`, `<`, `>` characters (per the PHP manual's allowed-character list for this filter). So the raw, attacker-controlled request URI (including query string) passes through almost unmodified into `Controller::$_urlBase` (set in `_init()`).

In `Controller::_jsonld()`, `$_urlBase` is spliced directly into one of the static `.jsonld` templates (`js/types.jsonld`, `js/paste.jsonld`, etc.) with a plain `str_replace()`, without any JSON-escaping:

```php $content = str_replace( '?jsonld=', $this->_urlBase . '?jsonld=', file_get_contents($file) ); ... header('Content-type: application/ld+json'); header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *'); header('Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET'); echo $content; ```

A request URI containing a literal `"` therefore breaks out of the JSON string in the `"@context"."pb"` value and injects arbitrary attacker-controlled key/value pairs into the response body, which is served with `Content-Type: application/ld+json` and `Access-Control-A…