https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 09 Oct 2026 10:12:11 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-342518 EUVD-2026-342518 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-342518 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55884 <p>Tilt defines dev environments as code for microservice apps on Kubernetes. From 0.20.8 through 0.37.3, the Tilt HUD HTTP server registers handlers on a gorilla/mux router with no authenticating middleware. When the HUD is bound to a non-loopback address, an unauthenticated network caller can trigger developer-defined resources, tamper with Tiltfile arguments, read full engine state including the session token, and invoke apiserver resources through the token-attaching /proxy handler. This issue is fixed in version 0.37.4.</p> <p>Tilt defines dev environments as code for microservice apps on Kubernetes. From 0.20.8 through 0.37.3, the Tilt HUD HTTP server registers handlers on a gorilla/mux router with no authenticating middleware. When the HUD is bound to a non-loopback address, an unauthenticated network caller can trigger developer-defined resources, tamper with Tiltfile arguments, read full engine state including the session token, and invoke apiserver resources through the token-attaching /proxy handler. This issue is fixed in version 0.37.4.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55884 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c73q-8xxr-rgqm <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/tilt-dev/tilt</p> <p>## Summary The Tilt HUD HTTP server exposes state-changing and sensitive-read endpoints with no authentication. When the HUD is bound to a non-loopback address, a network attacker can trigger the developer&#39;s pre-defined Tiltfile resources, tamper with Tiltfile arguments, read full engine state including the session token, and reach the Tilt apiserver through a token-attaching proxy.</p> <p>## Details The HUD server registers its handlers on a `gorilla/mux` router with no authenticating middleware. The `cookieWrapper` helper emits the `Tilt-Token` cookie but never validates it, and is attached only to the static-asset prefix.</p> <p>## Impact An unauthenticated network caller can force any developer-defined resource to run on the host as the `tilt` user (choosing which and when, not the command text), set arbitrary Tiltfile arguments, disclose the session token and full engine state, and invoke apiserver resources via the loopback-token proxy. Because `tilt up` runs with the developer&#39;s privileges and credentials, the impact reaches the developer&#39;s environment and cluster.</p> <p>### Conditions for exploitation - Affected version in `&gt;= 0.20.8, &lt;= 0.37.3`. - HUD bound to a non-loopback address (`tilt up --host 0.0.0.0`, or `TILT_HOST` set). - Network reachability to the listener (default port `10350`).</p> <p>### Not affected - The default loopback-only bind is not reachable from the network.</p> <p>## Workarounds Use the default loopback bind (omit `--host`, unset `TILT_HOST`) and ensure nothing else pro…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/tilt-dev/tilt</p> <p>## Summary The Tilt HUD HTTP server exposes state-changing and sensitive-read endpoints with no authentication. When the HUD is bound to a non-loopback address, a network attacker can trigger the developer&#39;s pre-defined Tiltfile resources, tamper with Tiltfile arguments, read full engine state including the session token, and reach the Tilt apiserver through a token-attaching proxy.</p> <p>## Details The HUD server registers its handlers on a `gorilla/mux` router with no authenticating middleware. The `cookieWrapper` helper emits the `Tilt-Token` cookie but never validates it, and is attached only to the static-asset prefix.</p> <p>## Impact An unauthenticated network caller can force any developer-defined resource to run on the host as the `tilt` user (choosing which and when, not the command text), set arbitrary Tiltfile arguments, disclose the session token and full engine state, and invoke apiserver resources via the loopback-token proxy. Because `tilt up` runs with the developer&#39;s privileges and credentials, the impact reaches the developer&#39;s environment and cluster.</p> <p>### Conditions for exploitation - Affected version in `&gt;= 0.20.8, &lt;= 0.37.3`. - HUD bound to a non-loopback address (`tilt up --host 0.0.0.0`, or `TILT_HOST` set). - Network reachability to the listener (default port `10350`).</p> <p>### Not affected - The default loopback-only bind is not reachable from the network.</p> <p>## Workarounds Use the default loopback bind (omit `--host`, unset `TILT_HOST`) and ensure nothing else pro…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c73q-8xxr-rgqm