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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-336443</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-336443</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-336443</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-336443</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-55883</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55883</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Tilt defines dev environments as code for microservice apps on Kubernetes. From 0.24.0 through 0.37.3, the Tilt HUD WebSocket at /ws/view is gated by a CSRF token, but the token is served by the unauthenticated /api/websocket_token endpoint and the upgrader accepts clients that omit an Origin header. When the HUD is network-exposed, an attacker who can reach the listener can open the HUD WebSocket and receive the full view stream, including session state, Tiltfile contents, resource statuses, and continued updates. This issue is fixed in version 0.37.4.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Tilt defines dev environments as code for microservice apps on Kubernetes. From 0.24.0 through 0.37.3, the Tilt HUD WebSocket at /ws/view is gated by a CSRF token, but the token is served by the unauthenticated /api/websocket_token endpoint and the upgrader accepts clients that omit an Origin header. When the HUD is network-exposed, an attacker who can reach the listener can open the HUD WebSocket and receive the full view stream, including session state, Tiltfile contents, resource statuses, and continued updates. This issue is fixed in version 0.37.4.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55883</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-6m68-r693-78qx — Tilt: Cross-site WebSocket hijacking of the Tilt HUD stream</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6m68-r693-78qx</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/tilt-dev/tilt&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
The Tilt HUD WebSocket (`/ws/view`) is gated by a CSRF token, but the token is served by an unauthenticated endpoint and the upgrader accepts any client that omits an `Origin` header. When the HUD is network-exposed, an attacker can open the HUD stream and read the developer&amp;#39;s session state.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details
The upgrader accepts a connection when the `csrf` query parameter matches a process-wide token (`websocketCSRFToken`). That token is served as `text/plain` by an unauthenticated handler (`WebsocketToken`, mounted at `/api/websocket_token`), so any reachable caller can fetch it and connect to `/ws/view?csrf=&amp;lt;token&amp;gt;`. When the parameter does not match, the upgrader falls back to a same-origin check that returns true when the `Origin` header is absent, so a non-browser client that omits `Origin` is accepted anyway. The token has no per-session binding.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
An attacker who can reach the HUD listener can open the HUD WebSocket and receive the full view stream — session state, Tiltfile contents, resource statuses, and continued updates — defeating the intended anti-CSWSH protection.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Conditions for exploitation
- Affected version in `&amp;gt;= 0.24.0, &amp;lt;= 0.37.3`.
- HUD bound to a non-loopback address (`tilt up --host 0.0.0.0`, or `TILT_HOST` set).
- Network reachability to the listener (default port `10350`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Not affected
- The default loopback-only bind is not reachable from the network.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workarounds
Use the default loopback bind (omit `--host`, unset `TILT_…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/tilt-dev/tilt&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
The Tilt HUD WebSocket (`/ws/view`) is gated by a CSRF token, but the token is served by an unauthenticated endpoint and the upgrader accepts any client that omits an `Origin` header. When the HUD is network-exposed, an attacker can open the HUD stream and read the developer&amp;#39;s session state.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details
The upgrader accepts a connection when the `csrf` query parameter matches a process-wide token (`websocketCSRFToken`). That token is served as `text/plain` by an unauthenticated handler (`WebsocketToken`, mounted at `/api/websocket_token`), so any reachable caller can fetch it and connect to `/ws/view?csrf=&amp;lt;token&amp;gt;`. When the parameter does not match, the upgrader falls back to a same-origin check that returns true when the `Origin` header is absent, so a non-browser client that omits `Origin` is accepted anyway. The token has no per-session binding.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
An attacker who can reach the HUD listener can open the HUD WebSocket and receive the full view stream — session state, Tiltfile contents, resource statuses, and continued updates — defeating the intended anti-CSWSH protection.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Conditions for exploitation
- Affected version in `&amp;gt;= 0.24.0, &amp;lt;= 0.37.3`.
- HUD bound to a non-loopback address (`tilt up --host 0.0.0.0`, or `TILT_HOST` set).
- Network reachability to the listener (default port `10350`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Not affected
- The default loopback-only bind is not reachable from the network.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workarounds
Use the default loopback bind (omit `--host`, unset `TILT_…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6m68-r693-78qx</guid>
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