<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 10 Oct 2026 17:09:30 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-332309</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-332309</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-332309</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-332309</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-55792</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55792</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Craft CMS is a content management system (CMS). In versions starting from 4.0.0-RC1 and prior to 4.18.0, and 5.0.0-RC1 and above, prior to 5.10.0, the dataUrl() Twig function is included in Craft’s Twig sandbox allowlist, allowing any control panel user granted the utility:system-messages permission to embed a file-reading payload into system email templates. When those emails are sent, the server reads the target file and returns its contents as a base64-encoded data URL embedded in the email body. The .env file, which typically contains the database password, CRAFT_SECURITY_KEY, and third-party API keys, passes all of Craft’s existing dataUrl() protection checks and is fully exfiltrated. Obtaining CRAFT_SECURITY_KEY enables an attacker to forge session tokens and escalate to full admin account takeover. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.18.0 and 5.10.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Craft CMS is a content management system (CMS). In versions starting from 4.0.0-RC1 and prior to 4.18.0, and 5.0.0-RC1 and above, prior to 5.10.0, the dataUrl() Twig function is included in Craft’s Twig sandbox allowlist, allowing any control panel user granted the utility:system-messages permission to embed a file-reading payload into system email templates. When those emails are sent, the server reads the target file and returns its contents as a base64-encoded data URL embedded in the email body. The .env file, which typically contains the database password, CRAFT_SECURITY_KEY, and third-party API keys, passes all of Craft’s existing dataUrl() protection checks and is fully exfiltrated. Obtaining CRAFT_SECURITY_KEY enables an attacker to forge session tokens and escalate to full admin account takeover. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.18.0 and 5.10.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55792</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-287w-mxq6-x2cp — Craft CMS: Sensitive File Disclosure / Server-Side File Read</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-287w-mxq6-x2cp</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: craftcms/cms&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `dataUrl()` Twig function is included in Craft’s Twig sandbox allowlist, allowing any control panel user granted the `utility:system-messages` permission to embed a file-reading payload into system email templates. When those emails are sent, the server reads the target file and returns its contents as a base64-encoded data URL embedded in the email body. The .env file, which typically contains the database password, CRAFT_SECURITY_KEY, and third-party API keys, passes all of Craft’s existing `dataUrl()` protection checks and is fully exfiltrated. Obtaining CRAFT_SECURITY_KEY enables an attacker to forge session tokens and escalate to full admin account takeover.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details
Affected versions: Craft CMS 4.x, 5.x (confirmed against 5.9.19)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability arises from the combination of three code facts:
1. dataUrl is in the Twig sandbox allowlist
src/config/twig-sandbox.php, line 115:
php&amp;#39;allowedFunctions&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; [
    ...
    &amp;#39;dataUrl&amp;#39;,   // ← allows file reading inside sandboxed templates
    ...
],&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. Html::dataUrl() does not block dotfiles
src/helpers/Html.php, lines 1065–1090. The function applies four checks before reading a file:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Must be within the project root .env is at the root
Must not be in a system directory (config/, vendor/, storage/, templates/) .env is not
Must not be a .php file  .env has no extension
File must exist .env always exists in a Craft install&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no check for dotfiles or specifically for .env. All four checks pass silently and file_get…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: craftcms/cms&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `dataUrl()` Twig function is included in Craft’s Twig sandbox allowlist, allowing any control panel user granted the `utility:system-messages` permission to embed a file-reading payload into system email templates. When those emails are sent, the server reads the target file and returns its contents as a base64-encoded data URL embedded in the email body. The .env file, which typically contains the database password, CRAFT_SECURITY_KEY, and third-party API keys, passes all of Craft’s existing `dataUrl()` protection checks and is fully exfiltrated. Obtaining CRAFT_SECURITY_KEY enables an attacker to forge session tokens and escalate to full admin account takeover.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details
Affected versions: Craft CMS 4.x, 5.x (confirmed against 5.9.19)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability arises from the combination of three code facts:
1. dataUrl is in the Twig sandbox allowlist
src/config/twig-sandbox.php, line 115:
php&amp;#39;allowedFunctions&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; [
    ...
    &amp;#39;dataUrl&amp;#39;,   // ← allows file reading inside sandboxed templates
    ...
],&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. Html::dataUrl() does not block dotfiles
src/helpers/Html.php, lines 1065–1090. The function applies four checks before reading a file:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Must be within the project root .env is at the root
Must not be in a system directory (config/, vendor/, storage/, templates/) .env is not
Must not be a .php file  .env has no extension
File must exist .env always exists in a Craft install&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no check for dotfiles or specifically for .env. All four checks pass silently and file_get…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-287w-mxq6-x2cp</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
