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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 08:23:45 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-332370</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-332370</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-332370</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-332370</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-55791</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55791</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Craft CMS is a content management system (CMS). Versions 4.0.0-RC1 and above, prior to 4.18.0 and 5.0.0-RC1, and above, prior to 5.10.0, are vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and Arbitrary JavaScript Injection through the /actions/app/resource-js endpoint. By exploiting the default permissive trustedHosts configuration, an attacker can poison the Host or X-Forwarded-Host header to manipulate the application’s $baseUrl. This bypasses the endpoint’s internal URL validation, forcing the backend Guzzle client to fetch a malicious payload from an attacker-controlled server and reflect it to the client with a Content-Type: application/javascript header. The vulnerability manifests when assetManager.cacheSourcePaths is set to false. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.18.0 and 5.10.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Craft CMS is a content management system (CMS). Versions 4.0.0-RC1 and above, prior to 4.18.0 and 5.0.0-RC1, and above, prior to 5.10.0, are vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and Arbitrary JavaScript Injection through the /actions/app/resource-js endpoint. By exploiting the default permissive trustedHosts configuration, an attacker can poison the Host or X-Forwarded-Host header to manipulate the application’s $baseUrl. This bypasses the endpoint’s internal URL validation, forcing the backend Guzzle client to fetch a malicious payload from an attacker-controlled server and reflect it to the client with a Content-Type: application/javascript header. The vulnerability manifests when assetManager.cacheSourcePaths is set to false. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.18.0 and 5.10.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55791</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-c55v-343g-5xff — Craft CMS: Blind SSRF and Arbitrary JavaScript Injection via Host Header Poisoning in actionResourceJs</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c55v-343g-5xff</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: craftcms/cms&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. Overview**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Craft CMS is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and Arbitrary JavaScript Injection through the `/actions/app/resource-js` endpoint. By exploiting the default permissive `trustedHosts` configuration, an attacker can poison the `Host` or `X-Forwarded-Host` header to manipulate the application’s `$baseUrl`. This bypasses the endpoint’s internal URL validation, forcing the backend Guzzle client to fetch a malicious payload from an attacker-controlled server and reflect it to the client with a `Content-Type: application/javascript` header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**2. Vulnerability Mechanism (Root Cause)**
The vulnerability manifests when `assetManager.cacheSourcePaths` is set to `false`. The attack chain relies on three structural flaws and insecure defaults:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **A. Default Proxy Trust (`trustedHosts`):** Craft’s default `GeneralConfig::$trustedHosts` is set to `[&amp;#39;any&amp;#39;]`. This allows an attacker to bypass front-end web server (Nginx/Apache) strict `Host` header validations by simply injecting an `X-Forwarded-Host` header. Yii2 will parse this and globally set `$baseUrl` to the attacker&amp;#39;s domain.
- **B. Insecure HTTP Client (`actionResourceJs`):** In `AppController::actionResourceJs()`, the `str_starts_with($url, $baseUrl)` validation is bypassed because `$baseUrl` is already poisoned by the attacker. The core then uses `Craft::createGuzzleClient()-&amp;gt;get($url)`. Unlike the GraphQL Asset fetcher, this Guzzle instance defaults to `ALLOW_REDIRECTS =&amp;gt; true`.
- **C. Forced JS…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: craftcms/cms&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. Overview**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Craft CMS is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and Arbitrary JavaScript Injection through the `/actions/app/resource-js` endpoint. By exploiting the default permissive `trustedHosts` configuration, an attacker can poison the `Host` or `X-Forwarded-Host` header to manipulate the application’s `$baseUrl`. This bypasses the endpoint’s internal URL validation, forcing the backend Guzzle client to fetch a malicious payload from an attacker-controlled server and reflect it to the client with a `Content-Type: application/javascript` header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**2. Vulnerability Mechanism (Root Cause)**
The vulnerability manifests when `assetManager.cacheSourcePaths` is set to `false`. The attack chain relies on three structural flaws and insecure defaults:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **A. Default Proxy Trust (`trustedHosts`):** Craft’s default `GeneralConfig::$trustedHosts` is set to `[&amp;#39;any&amp;#39;]`. This allows an attacker to bypass front-end web server (Nginx/Apache) strict `Host` header validations by simply injecting an `X-Forwarded-Host` header. Yii2 will parse this and globally set `$baseUrl` to the attacker&amp;#39;s domain.
- **B. Insecure HTTP Client (`actionResourceJs`):** In `AppController::actionResourceJs()`, the `str_starts_with($url, $baseUrl)` validation is bypassed because `$baseUrl` is already poisoned by the attacker. The core then uses `Craft::createGuzzleClient()-&amp;gt;get($url)`. Unlike the GraphQL Asset fetcher, this Guzzle instance defaults to `ALLOW_REDIRECTS =&amp;gt; true`.
- **C. Forced JS…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c55v-343g-5xff</guid>
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