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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-336135</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-336135</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-336135</description>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-55789</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55789</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Logto is the modern, open-source auth infrastructure for SaaS and AI apps. Prior to 1.41.0, Logto&amp;#39;s self-hosted SAML application IdP built the signed SAML response and assertion by string-substituting user-controlled profile attributes such as name, email, and custom attribute-mapping values into element-text placeholders of a SAML XML template using samlify 2.10.0, which left those placeholders unescaped. An authenticated low-privilege user could place XML markup in a profile attribute so Logto signed a forged SAML attribute, such as an arbitrary role, allowing privilege escalation at relying Service Providers that authorize on SAML attributes. This issue is fixed in version 1.41.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Logto is the modern, open-source auth infrastructure for SaaS and AI apps. Prior to 1.41.0, Logto&amp;#39;s self-hosted SAML application IdP built the signed SAML response and assertion by string-substituting user-controlled profile attributes such as name, email, and custom attribute-mapping values into element-text placeholders of a SAML XML template using samlify 2.10.0, which left those placeholders unescaped. An authenticated low-privilege user could place XML markup in a profile attribute so Logto signed a forged SAML attribute, such as an arbitrary role, allowing privilege escalation at relying Service Providers that authorize on SAML attributes. This issue is fixed in version 1.41.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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