https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 10:05:37 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-343767 EUVD-2026-343767 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-343767 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55734 <p>Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ueberauth guardian (Guardian.Permissions module) allows a denial of service via BEAM atom-table exhaustion.</p> <p>This vulnerability is associated with program file lib/guardian/permissions.ex and program routines &#39;Elixir.Guardian.Permissions&#39;:encode_permissions!/1, &#39;Elixir.Guardian.Permissions&#39;:encode_permissions_into_claims!/2, &#39;Elixir.Guardian.Permissions&#39;:do_encode_permissions!/2.</p> <p>The Guardian.Permissions mixin installs a public encode_permissions!/1 function on every module that does use Guardian.Permissions. For each key of the supplied map, encode_permissions!/1 calls String.to_atom(to_string(k)) before any validation runs. The integer-value clause of do_encode_permissions!/2 then short-circuits straight to encoding without validating the key against the configured permission set, so a key with an integer value is interned as a fresh atom with no exception raised. Atoms are never garbage collected and the BEAM atom table is a fixed-size resource (default roughly 1,048,576 entries), so each unique attacker-chosen key permanently consumes one slot. An attacker who can influence a permission map that reaches encode_permissions!/1 (for example a permissions map read from a request body and passed into token issuance via encode_permissions_into_claims!/2) can mint an unbounded number of atoms and exhaust the atom table, crashing the entire BEAM node and every service running on it. The sibling decode_permiss…</p> <p>Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ueberauth guardian (Guardian.Permissions module) allows a denial of service via BEAM atom-table exhaustion.</p> <p>This vulnerability is associated with program file lib/guardian/permissions.ex and program routines &#39;Elixir.Guardian.Permissions&#39;:encode_permissions!/1, &#39;Elixir.Guardian.Permissions&#39;:encode_permissions_into_claims!/2, &#39;Elixir.Guardian.Permissions&#39;:do_encode_permissions!/2.</p> <p>The Guardian.Permissions mixin installs a public encode_permissions!/1 function on every module that does use Guardian.Permissions. For each key of the supplied map, encode_permissions!/1 calls String.to_atom(to_string(k)) before any validation runs. The integer-value clause of do_encode_permissions!/2 then short-circuits straight to encoding without validating the key against the configured permission set, so a key with an integer value is interned as a fresh atom with no exception raised. Atoms are never garbage collected and the BEAM atom table is a fixed-size resource (default roughly 1,048,576 entries), so each unique attacker-chosen key permanently consumes one slot. An attacker who can influence a permission map that reaches encode_permissions!/1 (for example a permissions map read from a request body and passed into token issuance via encode_permissions_into_claims!/2) can mint an unbounded number of atoms and exhaust the atom table, crashing the entire BEAM node and every service running on it. The sibling decode_permiss…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55734