https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 23:17:50 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-336210 EUVD-2026-336210 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-336210 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55671 <p>ZITADEL is an open source identity management platform. From 4.0.0-rc.1 through 4.15.1, ZITADEL&#39;s HTTP notification channels, OIDC BackChannel Logout, and SAML metadata URL fetches do not consistently validate user-defined URLs against protected denylist handling, allowing server-side requests to loopback, internal IP, link-local, or redirected endpoints through DNS rebinding, redirects, or protocol downgrades. This issue is fixed in version 4.15.2.</p> <p>ZITADEL is an open source identity management platform. From 4.0.0-rc.1 through 4.15.1, ZITADEL&#39;s HTTP notification channels, OIDC BackChannel Logout, and SAML metadata URL fetches do not consistently validate user-defined URLs against protected denylist handling, allowing server-side requests to loopback, internal IP, link-local, or redirected endpoints through DNS rebinding, redirects, or protocol downgrades. This issue is fixed in version 4.15.2.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55671 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-29jh-8cfq-rr8x <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/zitadel/zitadel</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was discovered in Zitadel affecting:</p> <p>* **HTTP Notification Channels:** Used as an alternative to SMTP/Twilio configurations, sending payloads to user-defined URLs via HTTP POST webhooks. * **OIDC BackChannel Logout:** Terminates sessions across different applications. When a session ends, the Zitadel server sends an HTTP POST request to configured endpoints. * **SAML Metadata URL Fetches:** Fetches SAML metadata configurations from user-provided external URLs.</p> <p>User-defined URLs in these components were not properly validated against an internal denylist, allowing potentially malicious URLs to bypass restrictions. Furthermore, the existing denylist mechanism previously introduced for Actions was found to be vulnerable to **DNS rebinding**, **HTTP redirects**, and **protocol downgrades (HTTPS to HTTP)**, and it missed several common local network default entries.</p> <p>Because an attacker can supply arbitrary URLs—including loopback addresses, internal IPs, or cloud link-local addresses—they could potentially gather internal network architecture details, scan internal ports, or interact with unauthorized internal services and infrastructure.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>When a user-supplied URL points to a local host or internal IP address, an adversary can perform a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attack. This allows them to map internal network structures and exploit exposed internal services.</p> <p>By leveraging DNS rebinding, an a…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/zitadel/zitadel</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was discovered in Zitadel affecting:</p> <p>* **HTTP Notification Channels:** Used as an alternative to SMTP/Twilio configurations, sending payloads to user-defined URLs via HTTP POST webhooks. * **OIDC BackChannel Logout:** Terminates sessions across different applications. When a session ends, the Zitadel server sends an HTTP POST request to configured endpoints. * **SAML Metadata URL Fetches:** Fetches SAML metadata configurations from user-provided external URLs.</p> <p>User-defined URLs in these components were not properly validated against an internal denylist, allowing potentially malicious URLs to bypass restrictions. Furthermore, the existing denylist mechanism previously introduced for Actions was found to be vulnerable to **DNS rebinding**, **HTTP redirects**, and **protocol downgrades (HTTPS to HTTP)**, and it missed several common local network default entries.</p> <p>Because an attacker can supply arbitrary URLs—including loopback addresses, internal IPs, or cloud link-local addresses—they could potentially gather internal network architecture details, scan internal ports, or interact with unauthorized internal services and infrastructure.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>When a user-supplied URL points to a local host or internal IP address, an adversary can perform a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attack. This allows them to map internal network structures and exploit exposed internal services.</p> <p>By leveraging DNS rebinding, an a…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-29jh-8cfq-rr8x