<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 14:44:19 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-360058</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-360058</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-360058</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-360058</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-55529</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55529</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonai 4.6.58, the MCP HTTP Stream _validate_origin method accepts request_origin.startswith(allowed), so the attacker-controlled localhost.evil.example HTTP origin matches the localhost allowlist. Without an API key, a malicious webpage can submit tools/call requests to the local MCP server and execute exposed tools. This issue is fixed in version 4.6.58.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonai 4.6.58, the MCP HTTP Stream _validate_origin method accepts request_origin.startswith(allowed), so the attacker-controlled localhost.evil.example HTTP origin matches the localhost allowlist. Without an API key, a malicious webpage can submit tools/call requests to the local MCP server and execute exposed tools. This issue is fixed in version 4.6.58.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55529</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-wj6g-v78p-6fx3 — PraisonAI has an origin validation bypass in MCP HTTP Stream transport that allows browser-mediated unauthenticated too…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wj6g-v78p-6fx3</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: PraisonAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI&amp;#39;s MCP HTTP Stream transport uses an unsafe prefix match when validating the `Origin` header. The default localhost allowlist includes origins such as `http://localhost`, and the validation accepts any origin that starts with an allowed value.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, an attacker-controlled origin such as `http://localhost.evil.example` passes the localhost origin check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the MCP HTTP Stream server is started without an API key, which is the CLI default, this allows a malicious webpage to trigger unauthenticated MCP `tools/call` requests against a locally running PraisonAI MCP server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is best framed as a browser-mediated localhost attack / DNS-rebinding-style Origin validation bypass. The default server binds to `127.0.0.1`, so this is not a directly internet-facing unauthenticated API in the default configuration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Relevant source locations:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/cli.py`
- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/transports/http_stream.py`
- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/server.py`
- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/__init__.py`
- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/extended_capabilities.py`
- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/cli_tools.py`
- `src/praisonai/praisonai/capabilities/files.py`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The MCP CLI defaults to HTTP host `127.0.0.1`, API key `None`, and allowed origins `None` unless explicitly configured:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
parser.add_argument(&amp;#34;--host&amp;#34;, default=&amp;#34;127.0.0.1&amp;#34;)
parser.add_argument(&amp;#34;…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: PraisonAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI&amp;#39;s MCP HTTP Stream transport uses an unsafe prefix match when validating the `Origin` header. The default localhost allowlist includes origins such as `http://localhost`, and the validation accepts any origin that starts with an allowed value.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, an attacker-controlled origin such as `http://localhost.evil.example` passes the localhost origin check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the MCP HTTP Stream server is started without an API key, which is the CLI default, this allows a malicious webpage to trigger unauthenticated MCP `tools/call` requests against a locally running PraisonAI MCP server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is best framed as a browser-mediated localhost attack / DNS-rebinding-style Origin validation bypass. The default server binds to `127.0.0.1`, so this is not a directly internet-facing unauthenticated API in the default configuration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Relevant source locations:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/cli.py`
- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/transports/http_stream.py`
- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/server.py`
- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/__init__.py`
- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/extended_capabilities.py`
- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/cli_tools.py`
- `src/praisonai/praisonai/capabilities/files.py`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The MCP CLI defaults to HTTP host `127.0.0.1`, API key `None`, and allowed origins `None` unless explicitly configured:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
parser.add_argument(&amp;#34;--host&amp;#34;, default=&amp;#34;127.0.0.1&amp;#34;)
parser.add_argument(&amp;#34;…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wj6g-v78p-6fx3</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-3896 — PraisonAI has an origin validation bypass in MCP HTTP Stream transport that allows browser-mediated unauthenticated too…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3896</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI&amp;#39;s MCP HTTP Stream transport uses an unsafe prefix match when validating the `Origin` header. The default localhost allowlist includes origins such as `http://localhost`, and the validation accepts any origin that starts with an allowed value.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, an attacker-controlled origin such as `http://localhost.evil.example` passes the localhost origin check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the MCP HTTP Stream server is started without an API key, which is the CLI default, this allows a malicious webpage to trigger unauthenticated MCP `tools/call` requests against a locally running PraisonAI MCP server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is best framed as a browser-mediated localhost attack / DNS-rebinding-style Origin validation bypass. The default server binds to `127.0.0.1`, so this is not a directly internet-facing unauthenticated API in the default configuration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Relevant source locations:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/cli.py`
- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/transports/http_stream.py`
- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/server.py`
- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/__init__.py`
- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/extended_capabilities.py`
- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/cli_tools.py`
- `src/praisonai/praisonai/capabilities/files.py`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The MCP CLI defaults to HTTP host `127.0.0.1`, API key `None`, and allowed origins `None` unless explicitly configured:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
parser.add_argument(&amp;#34;--host&amp;#34;, default=&amp;#34;127.0.0.1&amp;#34;)
parser.add_argument(&amp;#34;…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI&amp;#39;s MCP HTTP Stream transport uses an unsafe prefix match when validating the `Origin` header. The default localhost allowlist includes origins such as `http://localhost`, and the validation accepts any origin that starts with an allowed value.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, an attacker-controlled origin such as `http://localhost.evil.example` passes the localhost origin check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the MCP HTTP Stream server is started without an API key, which is the CLI default, this allows a malicious webpage to trigger unauthenticated MCP `tools/call` requests against a locally running PraisonAI MCP server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is best framed as a browser-mediated localhost attack / DNS-rebinding-style Origin validation bypass. The default server binds to `127.0.0.1`, so this is not a directly internet-facing unauthenticated API in the default configuration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Relevant source locations:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/cli.py`
- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/transports/http_stream.py`
- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/server.py`
- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/__init__.py`
- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/extended_capabilities.py`
- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/cli_tools.py`
- `src/praisonai/praisonai/capabilities/files.py`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The MCP CLI defaults to HTTP host `127.0.0.1`, API key `None`, and allowed origins `None` unless explicitly configured:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
parser.add_argument(&amp;#34;--host&amp;#34;, default=&amp;#34;127.0.0.1&amp;#34;)
parser.add_argument(&amp;#34;…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3896</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
