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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-368139</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-368139</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-368139</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-368139</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-55451</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55451</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;gettext-converter provides gettext resource conversion utilities for JavaScript. Prior to 1.3.3, js2i18next() in lib/js2i18next.js splits nested translation keys using options.keyseparator, whose default value consists of two number signs, and uses each segment as a dynamic object key without rejecting __proto__, constructor, or prototype. When an application converts untrusted PO or i18next translation data, a __proto__ segment resolves Object.prototype as the nested write target and Object.assign writes attacker-controlled translated properties onto the process-wide prototype. The resulting prototype pollution can cause denial of service and may enable application-dependent follow-on attacks. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;gettext-converter provides gettext resource conversion utilities for JavaScript. Prior to 1.3.3, js2i18next() in lib/js2i18next.js splits nested translation keys using options.keyseparator, whose default value consists of two number signs, and uses each segment as a dynamic object key without rejecting __proto__, constructor, or prototype. When an application converts untrusted PO or i18next translation data, a __proto__ segment resolves Object.prototype as the nested write target and Object.assign writes attacker-controlled translated properties onto the process-wide prototype. The resulting prototype pollution can cause denial of service and may enable application-dependent follow-on attacks. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55451</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-f4jp-rw7w-ccwg — gettext-converter: Prototype pollution in js2i18next() via crafted translation keys</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f4jp-rw7w-ccwg</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: gettext-converter&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`js2i18next()` is vulnerable to prototype pollution. When converting translations, it splits nested keys on the key separator (default `##`) and uses each segment as a dynamic object key while building the output object. A key whose segment is `__proto__` (e.g. `__proto__##gcPolluted`) causes the converter to resolve `Object.prototype` as the nested write target and assign the translated value onto it, polluting `Object.prototype` for the whole runtime.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any application that converts translation data (PO / i18next JS objects) originating from an untrusted or user-controlled source is affected. Prototype pollution can lead to denial of service and, depending on the surrounding application, may enable further attacks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in `gettext-converter@1.3.3`. Key segments equal to `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype` are now rejected before being used as dynamic object keys.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Upgrade to `1.3.3`. If upgrading is not immediately possible, sanitize/validate translation keys before passing them to `js2i18next()` and reject any key whose `##`-separated segments include `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype`.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: gettext-converter&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`js2i18next()` is vulnerable to prototype pollution. When converting translations, it splits nested keys on the key separator (default `##`) and uses each segment as a dynamic object key while building the output object. A key whose segment is `__proto__` (e.g. `__proto__##gcPolluted`) causes the converter to resolve `Object.prototype` as the nested write target and assign the translated value onto it, polluting `Object.prototype` for the whole runtime.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any application that converts translation data (PO / i18next JS objects) originating from an untrusted or user-controlled source is affected. Prototype pollution can lead to denial of service and, depending on the surrounding application, may enable further attacks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in `gettext-converter@1.3.3`. Key segments equal to `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype` are now rejected before being used as dynamic object keys.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Upgrade to `1.3.3`. If upgrading is not immediately possible, sanitize/validate translation keys before passing them to `js2i18next()` and reject any key whose `##`-separated segments include `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype`.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f4jp-rw7w-ccwg</guid>
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