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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 23:16:07 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-330738</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330738</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-330738</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330738</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-55441</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55441</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;mise manages dev tools like node, python, cmake, and terraform. Prior to 2026.6.4, mise&amp;#39;s trust feature gates config files (mise.toml, .tool-versions) through trust_check, but task-include files are loaded on a path that never reaches it. When a directory has a task-include dir (mise-tasks/, .mise/tasks/, …) but no config file, mise falls back to the default includes and renders each task&amp;#39;s tera fields — and that tera environment has exec() registered. A {{ exec(command=&amp;#39;…&amp;#39;) }} in any rendered field runs arbitrary commands the moment the tasks are merely listed. There&amp;#39;s no config file to gate on, so no trust prompt ever appears. Read-only commands trigger it: mise tasks, mise task ls, mise run, mise tasks --usage (the query shell completion runs on Tab). The victim only has to cd into a cloned repo and list or tab-complete a task. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.6.4.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;mise manages dev tools like node, python, cmake, and terraform. Prior to 2026.6.4, mise&amp;#39;s trust feature gates config files (mise.toml, .tool-versions) through trust_check, but task-include files are loaded on a path that never reaches it. When a directory has a task-include dir (mise-tasks/, .mise/tasks/, …) but no config file, mise falls back to the default includes and renders each task&amp;#39;s tera fields — and that tera environment has exec() registered. A {{ exec(command=&amp;#39;…&amp;#39;) }} in any rendered field runs arbitrary commands the moment the tasks are merely listed. There&amp;#39;s no config file to gate on, so no trust prompt ever appears. Read-only commands trigger it: mise tasks, mise task ls, mise run, mise tasks --usage (the query shell completion runs on Tab). The victim only has to cd into a cloned repo and list or tab-complete a task. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.6.4.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55441</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-77g9-363w-rccq — Mise vulnerable to arbitrary command execution via task-include files in an untrusted, config-less repository</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-77g9-363w-rccq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: mise&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mise&amp;#39;s trust feature gates config files (`mise.toml`, `.tool-versions`) through `trust_check`, but task-include files are loaded on a path that never reaches it. When a directory has a task-include dir (`mise-tasks/`, `.mise/tasks/`, …) but no config file, mise falls back to the default includes and renders each task&amp;#39;s tera fields — and that tera environment has `exec()` registered. A `{{ exec(command=&amp;#39;…&amp;#39;) }}` in any rendered field runs arbitrary commands the moment the tasks are merely listed. There&amp;#39;s no config file to gate on, so no trust prompt ever appears. Read-only commands trigger it: `mise tasks`, `mise task ls`, `mise run`, `mise tasks --usage` (the query shell completion runs on Tab). The victim only has to `cd` into a cloned repo and list or tab-complete a task
## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Trust is enforced only inside config-file parsing:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `src/config/config_file/mise_toml.rs:276` — `MiseToml::from_str` → `trust_check(path)?`
- `src/config/config_file/tool_versions.rs:62` — `.tool-versions` parser → `trust_check(&amp;amp;path)?`
- `src/config/env_directive/mod.rs:681` — env templates → `trust_check(path)?` (only when the value contains template syntax)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Task-include files are loaded by `load_tasks_in_dir` / `load_local_tasks_with_context`,
which walk every directory from CWD up to root. For each directory, `configs_at_root`
returns the parsed (trusted) configs rooted there; **if there is no config in the
directory**, mise falls back to the default task-include list resolve…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: mise&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mise&amp;#39;s trust feature gates config files (`mise.toml`, `.tool-versions`) through `trust_check`, but task-include files are loaded on a path that never reaches it. When a directory has a task-include dir (`mise-tasks/`, `.mise/tasks/`, …) but no config file, mise falls back to the default includes and renders each task&amp;#39;s tera fields — and that tera environment has `exec()` registered. A `{{ exec(command=&amp;#39;…&amp;#39;) }}` in any rendered field runs arbitrary commands the moment the tasks are merely listed. There&amp;#39;s no config file to gate on, so no trust prompt ever appears. Read-only commands trigger it: `mise tasks`, `mise task ls`, `mise run`, `mise tasks --usage` (the query shell completion runs on Tab). The victim only has to `cd` into a cloned repo and list or tab-complete a task
## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Trust is enforced only inside config-file parsing:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `src/config/config_file/mise_toml.rs:276` — `MiseToml::from_str` → `trust_check(path)?`
- `src/config/config_file/tool_versions.rs:62` — `.tool-versions` parser → `trust_check(&amp;amp;path)?`
- `src/config/env_directive/mod.rs:681` — env templates → `trust_check(path)?` (only when the value contains template syntax)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Task-include files are loaded by `load_tasks_in_dir` / `load_local_tasks_with_context`,
which walk every directory from CWD up to root. For each directory, `configs_at_root`
returns the parsed (trusted) configs rooted there; **if there is no config in the
directory**, mise falls back to the default task-include list resolve…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-77g9-363w-rccq</guid>
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