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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-334033</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-334033</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-334033</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-334033</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-55438</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55438</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Coder allows organizations to provision remote development environments via Terraform. Prior to versions 2.29.17, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, and 2.34.2, Coder&amp;#39;s subdomain-based workspace app proxy allowed the same-owner CORS check to be bypassed. When a workspace-name subdomain segment parsed as a UUID, the workspace was resolved by ID without confirming the URL&amp;#39;s username matched the real owner, while the CORS middleware trusted the unverified username in the hostname. Practical exploitation requires subdomain app routing (wildcard hostname) enabled and a victim who visits the attacker&amp;#39;s crafted app URL while authenticated. The fix in versions 2.29.17, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, and 2.34.2 validates the subdomain username against the resolved workspace&amp;#39;s actual owner and bases the same-owner CORS decision on the authoritative owner identity. No known workarounds are available.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Coder allows organizations to provision remote development environments via Terraform. Prior to versions 2.29.17, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, and 2.34.2, Coder&amp;#39;s subdomain-based workspace app proxy allowed the same-owner CORS check to be bypassed. When a workspace-name subdomain segment parsed as a UUID, the workspace was resolved by ID without confirming the URL&amp;#39;s username matched the real owner, while the CORS middleware trusted the unverified username in the hostname. Practical exploitation requires subdomain app routing (wildcard hostname) enabled and a victim who visits the attacker&amp;#39;s crafted app URL while authenticated. The fix in versions 2.29.17, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, and 2.34.2 validates the subdomain username against the resolved workspace&amp;#39;s actual owner and bases the same-owner CORS decision on the authoritative owner identity. No known workarounds are available.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55438</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-5wg6-jmq2-53pw — Coder's workspace app CORS origin check can be bypassed via UUID-based subdomain spoofing</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5wg6-jmq2-53pw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/coder/coder/v2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Coder&amp;#39;s subdomain-based workspace app proxy allowed the same-owner CORS check to be bypassed. When a workspace-name subdomain segment parsed as a UUID, the workspace was resolved by ID without confirming the URL&amp;#39;s username matched the real owner, while the CORS middleware trusted the unverified username in the hostname.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; **Note:** Practical exploitation requires subdomain app routing (wildcard hostname) enabled and a victim who visits the attacker&amp;#39;s crafted app URL while authenticated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated user could craft a subdomain encoding their own workspace UUID and a victim&amp;#39;s username. If the victim visited the attacker&amp;#39;s URL, the attacker&amp;#39;s JavaScript could issue credentialed cross-origin `fetch()` requests to the victim&amp;#39;s workspace apps and read the responses, exfiltrating data accessible through those apps.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix validates the subdomain username against the resolved workspace&amp;#39;s actual owner and bases the same-owner CORS decision on the authoritative owner identity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix was backported to all supported release lines:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Release line | Patched version |
|---|---|
| 2.34 | [v2.34.2](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.34.2) |
| 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.33.8) |
| 2.32 | [v2.32.7](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.32.7) |
| 2.29 (ESR) | [v2.29.17](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.29.17) |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;None.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Resources&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Fix: #26086, #26085…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/coder/coder/v2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Coder&amp;#39;s subdomain-based workspace app proxy allowed the same-owner CORS check to be bypassed. When a workspace-name subdomain segment parsed as a UUID, the workspace was resolved by ID without confirming the URL&amp;#39;s username matched the real owner, while the CORS middleware trusted the unverified username in the hostname.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; **Note:** Practical exploitation requires subdomain app routing (wildcard hostname) enabled and a victim who visits the attacker&amp;#39;s crafted app URL while authenticated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated user could craft a subdomain encoding their own workspace UUID and a victim&amp;#39;s username. If the victim visited the attacker&amp;#39;s URL, the attacker&amp;#39;s JavaScript could issue credentialed cross-origin `fetch()` requests to the victim&amp;#39;s workspace apps and read the responses, exfiltrating data accessible through those apps.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix validates the subdomain username against the resolved workspace&amp;#39;s actual owner and bases the same-owner CORS decision on the authoritative owner identity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix was backported to all supported release lines:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Release line | Patched version |
|---|---|
| 2.34 | [v2.34.2](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.34.2) |
| 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.33.8) |
| 2.32 | [v2.32.7](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.32.7) |
| 2.29 (ESR) | [v2.29.17](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.29.17) |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;None.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Resources&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Fix: #26086, #26085…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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