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EUVD-2026-368961

fkie_cve-2026-55374

canto-saas-api is a PHP library for interacting with the Canto SaaS API. Prior to version 3.0.0, Request::buildRequestUrl() joins values returned by Request::getPathVariables() without encoding individual path segments, including the scheme and contentId values used by GetContentDetailsRequest. When a consuming application supplies an untrusted path variable value, path traversal sequences, query delimiters, or fragment delimiters can change the destination endpoint before AbstractEndpoint::sendRequest() attaches the configured authentication token. An attacker who controls that path variable value through the consuming application can cause unintended reads or writes with the configured application's privileges on the same Canto instance, but applications that pass only trusted and validated identifiers are not exploitable. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.0.

GHSA-9qfv-wgh2-m6p8 — canto-saas-api: Authenticated API requests can be redirected via unencoded path variables

Affected: Packagist: jleehr/canto-saas-api

## Summary

In affected versions, `Request::buildRequestUrl()` inserts path variables into the request URL without URL encoding (`implode('/', $pathVariables)`). All request classes implementing `getPathVariables()` are affected, e.g. `GetContentDetailsRequest` (`scheme`, `contentId`).

If a consuming application passes untrusted input (such as an ID taken from an HTTP request parameter) as a path variable, characters like `../`, `?` or `#` are sent verbatim and can change the path of the resulting API request.

## Impact

An attacker who controls a path variable value can redirect the library's authenticated request — the Bearer access token is attached in `AbstractEndpoint::sendRequest()` — to a different API endpoint of the same Canto instance, causing unintended reads or writes with the privileges of the configured app. The impact depends on how the consuming application sources path variable values; applications that only pass trusted, validated IDs are not exploitable.

## Patches

Fixed in 3.0.0: every path segment is encoded with `rawurlencode()` before being inserted into the request URL.

## Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade, validate untrusted values before passing them to request classes, e.g. enforce an allowlist pattern such as `^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$` for content IDs and schemes.