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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-329681</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329681</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-329681</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329681</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-55249</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55249</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;@rtk-ai/rtk-rewrite transparently rewrites shell commands executed via OpenClaw&amp;#39;s exec tool to their RTK equivalents. In 1.0.0, the @rtk-ai/rtk-rewrite OpenClaw plugin passes attacker-controlled input directly into a shell-backed execSync() template string without shell-safe escaping. JSON.stringify() wraps the value in double quotes and escapes inner double-quotes and backslashes, but leaves $() and backtick shell metacharacters untouched. Because execSync delegates execution to /bin/sh -c, the shell expands $(...) substitutions even inside double-quoted strings, causing the injected subcommand to execute before rtk is invoked. An attacker who can influence the exec tool&amp;#39;s command parameter (e.g., via an LLM agent prompt or gateway/tool-call input) achieves arbitrary OS command execution with the privileges of the plugin/gateway process.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;@rtk-ai/rtk-rewrite transparently rewrites shell commands executed via OpenClaw&amp;#39;s exec tool to their RTK equivalents. In 1.0.0, the @rtk-ai/rtk-rewrite OpenClaw plugin passes attacker-controlled input directly into a shell-backed execSync() template string without shell-safe escaping. JSON.stringify() wraps the value in double quotes and escapes inner double-quotes and backslashes, but leaves $() and backtick shell metacharacters untouched. Because execSync delegates execution to /bin/sh -c, the shell expands $(...) substitutions even inside double-quoted strings, causing the injected subcommand to execute before rtk is invoked. An attacker who can influence the exec tool&amp;#39;s command parameter (e.g., via an LLM agent prompt or gateway/tool-call input) achieves arbitrary OS command execution with the privileges of the plugin/gateway process.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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