https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 13:04:22 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-335571 EUVD-2026-335571 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-335571 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55208 <p>Pimcore Studio Backend Bundle is the backend bundle for Pimcore Studio. Prior to 2025.4.6 and 2026.1.6, an authenticated user can extract the admin password hash and other database content through time-based blind SQL injection in the DateFilter column key parameter. The POST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings endpoint and other listing endpoints accept a columnFilters array where the key field is interpolated directly into SQL with manual backtick wrapping, allowing a backtick character to break out of quoting and append arbitrary SQL such as SLEEP() and IF() subqueries. This issue is fixed in versions 2025.4.6 and 2026.1.6.</p> <p>Pimcore Studio Backend Bundle is the backend bundle for Pimcore Studio. Prior to 2025.4.6 and 2026.1.6, an authenticated user can extract the admin password hash and other database content through time-based blind SQL injection in the DateFilter column key parameter. The POST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings endpoint and other listing endpoints accept a columnFilters array where the key field is interpolated directly into SQL with manual backtick wrapping, allowing a backtick character to break out of quoting and append arbitrary SQL such as SLEEP() and IF() subqueries. This issue is fixed in versions 2025.4.6 and 2026.1.6.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55208 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-79cw-hfcc-7mw9 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: pimcore/studio-backend-bundle</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>An authenticated user extracts the admin password hash and any other database content through a time-based blind SQL injection in the `DateFilter` column key parameter. The `POST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings` endpoint (and 11 other listing endpoints) accepts a `columnFilters` array where the `key` field is interpolated directly into SQL with only manual backtick wrapping. The `DateFilter` uses fixed named parameters (`:minTime`, `:maxTime`), so the injected column name is not subject to PDO named parameter validation. An attacker breaks out of the backtick quoting with a backtick character and appends arbitrary SQL, including `SLEEP()` for time-based extraction and `IF()` subqueries for conditional data exfiltration.</p> <p>## Vulnerability Details</p> <p>### Exploitable: DateFilter with Fixed Named Parameters</p> <p>`src/Listing/Filter/DateFilter.php` lines 49-57 handle the `on` operator. The column key comes from user input and is placed in the SQL with manual backtick wrapping, while the named parameters are hardcoded as `:minTime` and `:maxTime`:</p> <p>```php $key = $column-&gt;getKey(); // user-controlled, no validation $dateCondition = &#39;`&#39; . $key . &#39;` &#39; . &#39; BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime&#39;; $listing-&gt;addConditionParam($dateCondition, [&#39;minTime&#39; =&gt; $value, &#39;maxTime&#39; =&gt; ...]); ```</p> <p>Because the named parameters are fixed strings, PDO accepts the binding regardless of what the column name contains.</p> <p>### Same Pattern in Note FilterService</p> <p>`src/Note/Service/FilterService.php` line…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: pimcore/studio-backend-bundle</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>An authenticated user extracts the admin password hash and any other database content through a time-based blind SQL injection in the `DateFilter` column key parameter. The `POST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings` endpoint (and 11 other listing endpoints) accepts a `columnFilters` array where the `key` field is interpolated directly into SQL with only manual backtick wrapping. The `DateFilter` uses fixed named parameters (`:minTime`, `:maxTime`), so the injected column name is not subject to PDO named parameter validation. An attacker breaks out of the backtick quoting with a backtick character and appends arbitrary SQL, including `SLEEP()` for time-based extraction and `IF()` subqueries for conditional data exfiltration.</p> <p>## Vulnerability Details</p> <p>### Exploitable: DateFilter with Fixed Named Parameters</p> <p>`src/Listing/Filter/DateFilter.php` lines 49-57 handle the `on` operator. The column key comes from user input and is placed in the SQL with manual backtick wrapping, while the named parameters are hardcoded as `:minTime` and `:maxTime`:</p> <p>```php $key = $column-&gt;getKey(); // user-controlled, no validation $dateCondition = &#39;`&#39; . $key . &#39;` &#39; . &#39; BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime&#39;; $listing-&gt;addConditionParam($dateCondition, [&#39;minTime&#39; =&gt; $value, &#39;maxTime&#39; =&gt; ...]); ```</p> <p>Because the named parameters are fixed strings, PDO accepts the binding regardless of what the column name contains.</p> <p>### Same Pattern in Note FilterService</p> <p>`src/Note/Service/FilterService.php` line…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-79cw-hfcc-7mw9