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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 09:59:23 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-335563</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-335563</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-335563</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-335563</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-55207</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55207</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Pimcore is an Open Source Data &amp;amp; Experience Management Platform. Prior to 2025.4.6 and 2026.1.6, an unauthenticated attacker who knows a valid admin username can take over any Pimcore admin account by sending a password reset request with an attacker-controlled resetPasswordUrl. The server generates a real cryptographic recovery token, appends it to the supplied URL, and emails the link to the victim; when the victim clicks the link, the token is sent to the attacker and can be used with POST /pimcore-studio/api/login/token to authenticate with full admin privileges while bypassing two-factor authentication. This issue is fixed in versions 2025.4.6 and 2026.1.6.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Pimcore is an Open Source Data &amp;amp; Experience Management Platform. Prior to 2025.4.6 and 2026.1.6, an unauthenticated attacker who knows a valid admin username can take over any Pimcore admin account by sending a password reset request with an attacker-controlled resetPasswordUrl. The server generates a real cryptographic recovery token, appends it to the supplied URL, and emails the link to the victim; when the victim clicks the link, the token is sent to the attacker and can be used with POST /pimcore-studio/api/login/token to authenticate with full admin privileges while bypassing two-factor authentication. This issue is fixed in versions 2025.4.6 and 2026.1.6.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55207</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-h854-c3m3-mh5v — Pimcore: Account Takeover via Password Reset URL Injection allows unauthenticated attacker to hijack any admin account…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h854-c3m3-mh5v</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: pimcore/studio-backend-bundle&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unauthenticated attacker takes over any Pimcore admin account by sending a password reset request with an attacker-controlled `resetPasswordUrl`. The server generates a real cryptographic recovery token, appends it to the attacker&amp;#39;s URL, and emails the link to the victim. When the victim clicks the link in their email, the token is sent to the attacker&amp;#39;s server. The attacker then uses `POST /pimcore-studio/api/login/token` to authenticate as the victim with full admin privileges. Token login explicitly disables two-factor authentication, so even accounts with TOTP/Google Authenticator are compromised.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerability Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Unauthenticated Endpoint Accepts Attacker URL&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The reset password endpoint at `src/User/Controller/ResetPasswordController.php` line 53 is public (uses `PUBLIC_STUDIO_API` voter). The `ResetPassword` schema at `src/User/Schema/ResetPassword.php` accepts a `resetPasswordUrl` string as a required parameter with zero validation. No URL scheme check, no domain allowlist, no comparison against the configured system domain.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
final readonly class ResetPassword
{
    public function __construct(
        private string $username,
        private string $resetPasswordUrl  // attacker-controlled, no validation
    ) {}
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Token Appended to Attacker URL&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `src/User/Service/UserLoginService.php` at line 64-65, the service generates a real recovery token and concatenates the attacker&amp;#39;s URL with the token:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$token = $this-&amp;gt;…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: pimcore/studio-backend-bundle&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unauthenticated attacker takes over any Pimcore admin account by sending a password reset request with an attacker-controlled `resetPasswordUrl`. The server generates a real cryptographic recovery token, appends it to the attacker&amp;#39;s URL, and emails the link to the victim. When the victim clicks the link in their email, the token is sent to the attacker&amp;#39;s server. The attacker then uses `POST /pimcore-studio/api/login/token` to authenticate as the victim with full admin privileges. Token login explicitly disables two-factor authentication, so even accounts with TOTP/Google Authenticator are compromised.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerability Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Unauthenticated Endpoint Accepts Attacker URL&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The reset password endpoint at `src/User/Controller/ResetPasswordController.php` line 53 is public (uses `PUBLIC_STUDIO_API` voter). The `ResetPassword` schema at `src/User/Schema/ResetPassword.php` accepts a `resetPasswordUrl` string as a required parameter with zero validation. No URL scheme check, no domain allowlist, no comparison against the configured system domain.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
final readonly class ResetPassword
{
    public function __construct(
        private string $username,
        private string $resetPasswordUrl  // attacker-controlled, no validation
    ) {}
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Token Appended to Attacker URL&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `src/User/Service/UserLoginService.php` at line 64-65, the service generates a real recovery token and concatenates the attacker&amp;#39;s URL with the token:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$token = $this-&amp;gt;…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h854-c3m3-mh5v</guid>
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