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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-333843</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-333843</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-333843</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-333843</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-55079</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55079</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Coder allows organizations to provision remote development environments via Terraform. Starting in version 2.24.0 and prior to versions 2.29.7, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, and 2.34.2, `NewDataBuilder` in `provisionersdk/proto/dataupload.go` allocated a byte slice using the client-supplied `FileSize` from a `DataUpload` message without an upper-bound check. Although the DRPC wire limit is 4 MiB, the `FileSize` value itself was unconstrained. The fix in versions 2.29.7, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, and 2.34.2 validates `FileSize` against an upper bound (`MaxFileSize = 100 MiB`) before allocation. As a workaround, restrict access to the provisioner daemon serve endpoint to trusted provisioner daemon service accounts.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Coder allows organizations to provision remote development environments via Terraform. Starting in version 2.24.0 and prior to versions 2.29.7, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, and 2.34.2, `NewDataBuilder` in `provisionersdk/proto/dataupload.go` allocated a byte slice using the client-supplied `FileSize` from a `DataUpload` message without an upper-bound check. Although the DRPC wire limit is 4 MiB, the `FileSize` value itself was unconstrained. The fix in versions 2.29.7, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, and 2.34.2 validates `FileSize` against an upper bound (`MaxFileSize = 100 MiB`) before allocation. As a workaround, restrict access to the provisioner daemon serve endpoint to trusted provisioner daemon service accounts.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55079</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-f962-qm93-mj4c — Coder's unbounded memory allocation in provisioner file upload allows authenticated denial of service</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f962-qm93-mj4c</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/coder/coder/v2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`NewDataBuilder` in `provisionersdk/proto/dataupload.go` allocated a byte slice using the client-supplied `FileSize` from a `DataUpload` message without an upper-bound check. Although the DRPC wire limit is 4 MiB, the `FileSize` value itself was unconstrained&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated user able to reach the provisioner daemon serve endpoint could send a roughly 50-byte message declaring a huge `FileSize` (for example 1 TiB), triggering an unrecoverable Go out-of-memory abort that terminates `coderd`. This is a single-message denial of service affecting the entire deployment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix validates `FileSize` against an upper bound (`MaxFileSize = 100 MiB`) before allocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix was backported to all supported release lines:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Release line | Patched version |
|---|---|
| 2.34 | [v2.34.2](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.34.2) |
| 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.33.8) |
| 2.32 | [v2.32.7](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.32.7) |
| 2.29 (ESR) | [v2.29.17](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.29.17) |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Restrict access to the provisioner daemon serve endpoint to trusted provisioner daemon service accounts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Resources&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Fix: #25710&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Credits&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Coder would like to thank Anthropic&amp;#39;s Security Team (ANT-2026-22442) for independently disclosing this issue!&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/coder/coder/v2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`NewDataBuilder` in `provisionersdk/proto/dataupload.go` allocated a byte slice using the client-supplied `FileSize` from a `DataUpload` message without an upper-bound check. Although the DRPC wire limit is 4 MiB, the `FileSize` value itself was unconstrained&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated user able to reach the provisioner daemon serve endpoint could send a roughly 50-byte message declaring a huge `FileSize` (for example 1 TiB), triggering an unrecoverable Go out-of-memory abort that terminates `coderd`. This is a single-message denial of service affecting the entire deployment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix validates `FileSize` against an upper bound (`MaxFileSize = 100 MiB`) before allocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix was backported to all supported release lines:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Release line | Patched version |
|---|---|
| 2.34 | [v2.34.2](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.34.2) |
| 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.33.8) |
| 2.32 | [v2.32.7](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.32.7) |
| 2.29 (ESR) | [v2.29.17](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.29.17) |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Restrict access to the provisioner daemon serve endpoint to trusted provisioner daemon service accounts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Resources&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Fix: #25710&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Credits&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Coder would like to thank Anthropic&amp;#39;s Security Team (ANT-2026-22442) for independently disclosing this issue!&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f962-qm93-mj4c</guid>
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