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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-292456</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292456</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-292456</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292456</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-5501</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-5501</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert in the OpenSSL compatibility layer accepts a certificate chain in which the leaf&amp;#39;s signature is not checked, if the attacker supplies an untrusted intermediate with Basic Constraints `CA:FALSE` that is legitimately signed by a trusted root. An attacker who obtains any leaf certificate from a trusted CA (e.g. a free DV cert from Let&amp;#39;s Encrypt) can forge a certificate for any subject name with any public key and arbitrary signature bytes, and the function returns `WOLFSSL_SUCCESS` / `X509_V_OK`. The native wolfSSL TLS handshake path (`ProcessPeerCerts`) is not susceptible and the issue is limited to applications using the OpenSSL compatibility API directly, which would include integrations of wolfSSL into nginx and haproxy.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert in the OpenSSL compatibility layer accepts a certificate chain in which the leaf&amp;#39;s signature is not checked, if the attacker supplies an untrusted intermediate with Basic Constraints `CA:FALSE` that is legitimately signed by a trusted root. An attacker who obtains any leaf certificate from a trusted CA (e.g. a free DV cert from Let&amp;#39;s Encrypt) can forge a certificate for any subject name with any public key and arbitrary signature bytes, and the function returns `WOLFSSL_SUCCESS` / `X509_V_OK`. The native wolfSSL TLS handshake path (`ProcessPeerCerts`) is not susceptible and the issue is limited to applications using the OpenSSL compatibility API directly, which would include integrations of wolfSSL into nginx and haproxy.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-5501</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hg75-4cmp-f367</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hg75-4cmp-f367</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert in the OpenSSL compatibility layer accepts a certificate chain in which the leaf&amp;#39;s signature is not checked, if the attacker supplies an untrusted intermediate with Basic Constraints `CA:FALSE` that is legitimately signed by a trusted root. An attacker who obtains any leaf certificate from a trusted CA (e.g. a free DV cert from Let&amp;#39;s Encrypt) can forge a certificate for any subject name with any public key and arbitrary signature bytes, and the function returns `WOLFSSL_SUCCESS` / `X509_V_OK`. The native wolfSSL TLS handshake path (`ProcessPeerCerts`) is not susceptible and the issue is limited to applications using the OpenSSL compatibility API directly, which would include integrations of wolfSSL into nginx and haproxy.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert in the OpenSSL compatibility layer accepts a certificate chain in which the leaf&amp;#39;s signature is not checked, if the attacker supplies an untrusted intermediate with Basic Constraints `CA:FALSE` that is legitimately signed by a trusted root. An attacker who obtains any leaf certificate from a trusted CA (e.g. a free DV cert from Let&amp;#39;s Encrypt) can forge a certificate for any subject name with any public key and arbitrary signature bytes, and the function returns `WOLFSSL_SUCCESS` / `X509_V_OK`. The native wolfSSL TLS handshake path (`ProcessPeerCerts`) is not susceptible and the issue is limited to applications using the OpenSSL compatibility API directly, which would include integrations of wolfSSL into nginx and haproxy.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hg75-4cmp-f367</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-5501 — Improper Certificate Signature Verification in X.509 Chain Validation Allows Forged Leaf Certificates</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-5501</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-5501</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-5501</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-5501</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-5501</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:25.10: wolfssl, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: wolfssl&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert in the OpenSSL compatibility layer accepts a certificate chain in which the leaf&amp;#39;s signature is not checked, if the attacker supplies an untrusted intermediate with Basic Constraints `CA:FALSE` that is legitimately signed by a trusted root. An attacker who obtains any leaf certificate from a trusted CA (e.g. a free DV cert from Let&amp;#39;s Encrypt) can forge a certificate for any subject name with any public key and arbitrary signature bytes, and the function returns `WOLFSSL_SUCCESS` / `X509_V_OK`. The native wolfSSL TLS handshake path (`ProcessPeerCerts`) is not susceptible and the issue is limited to applications using the OpenSSL compatibility API directly, which would include integrations of wolfSSL into nginx and haproxy.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:25.10: wolfssl, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: wolfssl&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert in the OpenSSL compatibility layer accepts a certificate chain in which the leaf&amp;#39;s signature is not checked, if the attacker supplies an untrusted intermediate with Basic Constraints `CA:FALSE` that is legitimately signed by a trusted root. An attacker who obtains any leaf certificate from a trusted CA (e.g. a free DV cert from Let&amp;#39;s Encrypt) can forge a certificate for any subject name with any public key and arbitrary signature bytes, and the function returns `WOLFSSL_SUCCESS` / `X509_V_OK`. The native wolfSSL TLS handshake path (`ProcessPeerCerts`) is not susceptible and the issue is limited to applications using the OpenSSL compatibility API directly, which would include integrations of wolfSSL into nginx and haproxy.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-5501</guid>
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