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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-329761</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329761</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-329761</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329761</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-54588</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54588</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Poweradmin is a web-based DNS administration tool for PowerDNS server. Versions prior to 4.2.4 and 4.3.3 use the attacker-controlled `HTTP_HOST` request header as the authoritative source for building callback URLs in its OIDC, SAML, and logout authentication flows without any validation. An unauthenticated attacker can poison the `redirect_uri` sent to the Identity Provider, causing the IdP to redirect the victim&amp;#39;s authorization code to an attacker-controlled server - resulting in full account takeover with no credentials required. Versions 4.2.4 and 4.3.3 patch the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Poweradmin is a web-based DNS administration tool for PowerDNS server. Versions prior to 4.2.4 and 4.3.3 use the attacker-controlled `HTTP_HOST` request header as the authoritative source for building callback URLs in its OIDC, SAML, and logout authentication flows without any validation. An unauthenticated attacker can poison the `redirect_uri` sent to the Identity Provider, causing the IdP to redirect the victim&amp;#39;s authorization code to an attacker-controlled server - resulting in full account takeover with no credentials required. Versions 4.2.4 and 4.3.3 patch the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54588</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3735-5339-xfwx — Poweradmin has Host Header Injection in OIDC redirect_uri, SAML ACS/SLO URL, and Logout Redirect Construction.</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3735-5339-xfwx</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: poweradmin/poweradmin&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
Poweradmin v4.3.2 uses the attacker-controlled `HTTP_HOST` request header as the
  authoritative source for building callback URLs in its OIDC, SAML, and logout
  authentication flows without any validation. An unauthenticated attacker can poison
  the `redirect_uri` sent to the Identity Provider, causing the IdP to redirect the
  victim&amp;#39;s authorization code to an attacker-controlled server - resulting in full
  account takeover with no credentials required.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Three independent code paths are affected:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Primary (Critical):** `OidcService::getCallbackUrl()` - `redirect_uri` poisoning
  - **Secondary (High):** `SamlConfigurationService::getBaseUrl()` - SAML ACS/SLO URL poisoning
  - **Tertiary (Medium):** `LogoutController::getBaseUrl()` - post-logout redirect poisoning&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;***Root Cause***&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The application constructs absolute URLs dynamically from `HTTP_HOST` rather than
  from a trusted configured base URL. The header is fully client-controlled and is not
  validated before use in any authentication flow.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Poweradmin&amp;#39;s own codebase contains the correct pattern -
  `DocsController::getValidatedHost()` (line 244) calls `isValidHostname()` before
  using the value - but this was never applied to authentication flows.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Primary: `lib/Application/Service/OidcService.php` (~line 460)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
  private function getCallbackUrl(): string
  {
      $scheme = $this-&amp;gt;detectScheme();
      // HTTP_HOST taken directly with zero validation
      $hos…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: poweradmin/poweradmin&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
Poweradmin v4.3.2 uses the attacker-controlled `HTTP_HOST` request header as the
  authoritative source for building callback URLs in its OIDC, SAML, and logout
  authentication flows without any validation. An unauthenticated attacker can poison
  the `redirect_uri` sent to the Identity Provider, causing the IdP to redirect the
  victim&amp;#39;s authorization code to an attacker-controlled server - resulting in full
  account takeover with no credentials required.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Three independent code paths are affected:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Primary (Critical):** `OidcService::getCallbackUrl()` - `redirect_uri` poisoning
  - **Secondary (High):** `SamlConfigurationService::getBaseUrl()` - SAML ACS/SLO URL poisoning
  - **Tertiary (Medium):** `LogoutController::getBaseUrl()` - post-logout redirect poisoning&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;***Root Cause***&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The application constructs absolute URLs dynamically from `HTTP_HOST` rather than
  from a trusted configured base URL. The header is fully client-controlled and is not
  validated before use in any authentication flow.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Poweradmin&amp;#39;s own codebase contains the correct pattern -
  `DocsController::getValidatedHost()` (line 244) calls `isValidHostname()` before
  using the value - but this was never applied to authentication flows.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Primary: `lib/Application/Service/OidcService.php` (~line 460)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
  private function getCallbackUrl(): string
  {
      $scheme = $this-&amp;gt;detectScheme();
      // HTTP_HOST taken directly with zero validation
      $hos…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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