<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 00:50:45 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-357600</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-357600</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-357600</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-357600</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-54508</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54508</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;TREK is a collaborative travel planner. Prior to 3.1.0, TREK validates only the initial URL before native redirect following in importGoogleList() and importNaverList() in server/src/services/placeService.ts and resolveGoogleMapsUrl() in server/src/services/mapsService.ts. The affected sinks call checkSsrf() from server/src/utils/ssrfGuard.ts and then use fetch() with redirect: &amp;#39;follow&amp;#39; instead of the DNS-pinned safeFetch() path, so a public attacker-controlled URL can redirect the server to loopback, RFC 1918, or cloud metadata addresses without revalidation. An authenticated trip member can reach the list-import routes, and any authenticated user can reach /api/maps/resolve-url, allowing blind GET requests to internal services without response-body reflection. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;TREK is a collaborative travel planner. Prior to 3.1.0, TREK validates only the initial URL before native redirect following in importGoogleList() and importNaverList() in server/src/services/placeService.ts and resolveGoogleMapsUrl() in server/src/services/mapsService.ts. The affected sinks call checkSsrf() from server/src/utils/ssrfGuard.ts and then use fetch() with redirect: &amp;#39;follow&amp;#39; instead of the DNS-pinned safeFetch() path, so a public attacker-controlled URL can redirect the server to loopback, RFC 1918, or cloud metadata addresses without revalidation. An authenticated trip member can reach the list-import routes, and any authenticated user can reach /api/maps/resolve-url, allowing blind GET requests to internal services without response-body reflection. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54508</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
