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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-349586</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-349586</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-349586</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-349586</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-54412</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54412</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;LiamBindle MQTT-C through version 1.1.6 contains a heap-based out-of-bounds read and integer underflow in the mqtt_unpack_publish_response function in src/mqtt.c that allows a remote unauthenticated attacker controlling an MQTT broker - or able to inject MQTT traffic into an unencrypted session - to crash a subscribed MQTT-C client and potentially disclose adjacent heap memory by sending a single crafted PUBLISH packet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;LiamBindle MQTT-C through version 1.1.6 contains a heap-based out-of-bounds read and integer underflow in the mqtt_unpack_publish_response function in src/mqtt.c that allows a remote unauthenticated attacker controlling an MQTT broker - or able to inject MQTT traffic into an unencrypted session - to crash a subscribed MQTT-C client and potentially disclose adjacent heap memory by sending a single crafted PUBLISH packet.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54412</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-28cw-rpqc-wqqj</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-28cw-rpqc-wqqj</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;LiamBindle MQTT-C through version 1.1.6 contains a heap-based out-of-bounds read and integer underflow in the mqtt_unpack_publish_response() function in src/mqtt.c that allows a remote unauthenticated attacker controlling an MQTT broker - or able to inject MQTT traffic into an unencrypted session - to crash a subscribed MQTT-C client and potentially disclose adjacent heap memory by sending a single crafted PUBLISH packet. The function validates only that the fixed-header remaining_length is at least 4, then reads the 16-bit topic_name_size field from the broker-controlled packet and advances the parse pointer by that value without verifying that topic_name_size plus the surrounding overhead fits within remaining_length; it subsequently computes application_message_size as remaining_length - topic_name_size - 2 (QoS 0) or - 4 (QoS greater than 0) in unsigned arithmetic, producing an integer underflow that is then passed to memmove(). A PUBLISH packet with topic_name_size = 0xFFFF and remaining_length = 7 advances the parse pointer 65535 bytes past the receive buffer (out-of-bounds read) and causes an application_message_size near 2^32, crashing the process when the resulting memmove() is executed.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;LiamBindle MQTT-C through version 1.1.6 contains a heap-based out-of-bounds read and integer underflow in the mqtt_unpack_publish_response() function in src/mqtt.c that allows a remote unauthenticated attacker controlling an MQTT broker - or able to inject MQTT traffic into an unencrypted session - to crash a subscribed MQTT-C client and potentially disclose adjacent heap memory by sending a single crafted PUBLISH packet. The function validates only that the fixed-header remaining_length is at least 4, then reads the 16-bit topic_name_size field from the broker-controlled packet and advances the parse pointer by that value without verifying that topic_name_size plus the surrounding overhead fits within remaining_length; it subsequently computes application_message_size as remaining_length - topic_name_size - 2 (QoS 0) or - 4 (QoS greater than 0) in unsigned arithmetic, producing an integer underflow that is then passed to memmove(). A PUBLISH packet with topic_name_size = 0xFFFF and remaining_length = 7 advances the parse pointer 65535 bytes past the receive buffer (out-of-bounds read) and causes an application_message_size near 2^32, crashing the process when the resulting memmove() is executed.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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