Most recent entries from all

EUVD-2026-330851

fkie_cve-2026-54352

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, `POST /api/pwa/process-zip` at packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts:24 accepts a builder-uploaded .zip, extracts it with extract-zip@2.0.1 into a temp directory, then for each entry listed in icons.json validates the icon path, opens it, and streams the bytes into MinIO. The resulting object is served back via GET /api/assets/{appId}/pwa/{uuid}.png. extract-zip@2.0.1 preserves absolute symlink targets when restoring symlink entries. The icon-source validator at packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:259-268 resolves the icon source string against baseDir (path.resolve), checks resolvedSrc.startsWith(baseDir + path.sep) against that string, and calls fs.existsSync(resolvedSrc) which follows symbolic links to confirm the target exists. None of the three calls reject symbolic-link entries. packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/objectStore.ts:302 then calls (await fsp.open(path)).createReadStream() on the resolved path. fsp.open follows the symlink, the target file's bytes stream into MinIO, and the response of the asset-fetch endpoint returns those bytes verbatim. Result: a workspace-level builder reads any file the server process can open. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.9.

GHSA-w7mq-r738-x278 — Budibase has arbitrary file read by workspace-builder via PWA-zip symlink upload

Affected: npm: @budibase/server

## Summary

`POST /api/pwa/process-zip` at `packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts:24` accepts a builder-uploaded `.zip`, extracts it with `extract-zip@2.0.1` into a temp directory, then for each entry listed in `icons.json` validates the icon path, opens it, and streams the bytes into MinIO. The resulting object is served back via `GET /api/assets/{appId}/pwa/{uuid}.png`.

`extract-zip@2.0.1` preserves absolute symlink targets when restoring symlink entries. The icon-source validator at `packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:259-268` resolves the icon source string against `baseDir` (`path.resolve`), checks `resolvedSrc.startsWith(baseDir + path.sep)` against that string, and calls `fs.existsSync(resolvedSrc)` which follows symbolic links to confirm the target exists. None of the three calls reject symbolic-link entries, so an entry stored at `baseDir/evil.png` but pointing at `/data/.env` passes the gate.

`packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/objectStore.ts:302` then calls `(await fsp.open(path)).createReadStream()` on the resolved path. `fsp.open` follows the symlink, the target file's bytes stream into MinIO, and the response of the asset-fetch endpoint returns those bytes verbatim.

Result: a workspace-level builder reads any file the server process can open (root inside the default Docker image, including `/data/.env` with `JWT_SECRET`, `INTERNAL_API_KEY`, `MINIO_*`, `REDIS_PASSWORD`, `COUCHDB_PASSWORD`, `DATABASE_URL`) by uploading one crafted PWA zi…

WID-SEC-W-2026-1806 — Budibase: Mehrere Schwachstellen

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Budibase ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, und um Dateien zu manipulieren.