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EUVD-2026-368070

fkie_cve-2026-54175

backpack/crud provides Create, Read, Update & Delete (CRUD) functions for Backpack, a collection of Laravel packages that help users build custom administration panels. Prior to 6.8.11 and 7.0.34, MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm in src/app/Http/Controllers/MyAccountController.php at POST /admin/edit-account-info passes request data from $request->except(['_token']) to the user model instead of restricting updates to fields accepted by AccountInfoRequest::validationData(). An attacker with an authenticated Backpack session can therefore mass-assign password, the authentication column, or other deployment-specific fillable attributes. With the default Laravel 11 user model, a submitted plaintext password is automatically hashed and persisted, converting temporary session access into persistent account takeover without the old_password check enforced by the separate password-change route. Changing the authentication email can also enable later password-reset takeover, while additional fillable security attributes can permit deployment-specific privilege escalation or security-control changes. This issue is fixed in versions 6.8.11 and 7.0.34.

GHSA-xpv2-hrfc-hw62 — Laravel Backpack CRUD: Unverified password change in MyAccountController via mass assignment

Affected: Packagist: backpack/crud

## Summary

The `MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm` action bound to `POST /admin/edit-account-info` calls `$this->guard()->user()->update($request->except(['_token']))`. Because the controller uses `except(['_token'])` rather than `$request->validated()` or the restricted keys defined in `AccountInfoRequest::validationData()`, **any column present in the user model's `$fillable` array is mass-assigned from the request**, including `password`. Backpack ships a separate `POST /admin/change-password` route (`postChangePasswordForm`) that requires `old_password` verification via `ChangePasswordRequest::withValidator`. The `edit-account-info` endpoint silently bypasses that security control.

For the default Laravel 11 `App\Models\User` model — which Backpack's installer and documentation use as the canonical admin user model — `$fillable` is `['name','email','password']`. The `password` cast is `hashed`, so a plaintext `password=…` form field is automatically hashed and persisted. Any attacker holding an authenticated Backpack session (session theft, stolen cookies, XSS, public-terminal residual session) can permanently take over the account by issuing one POST that includes `password=<attacker_value>`, with no knowledge of the victim's current password. This converts time-limited, session-bound access into persistent account takeover.

## Vulnerable code

`src/app/Http/Controllers/MyAccountController.php:38`

```php public function postAccountInfoForm(AccountInfoRequest…