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EUVD-2026-368632

fkie_cve-2026-54167

Pipelines-as-Code is a CI/CD system that lets users define Tekton pipelines in source code repositories. Prior to 0.37.8, 0.39.6, 0.42.1, and 0.48.0, the GitHub App provider accepts X-GitHub-Enterprise-Host as the API host while processing webhook events containing an installation.id, before webhook signature validation or confirmation that the host matches the repository URL in the signed payload. An unauthenticated attacker who can reach the webhook endpoint can select an attacker-controlled host and cause the controller to send a locally signed GitHub App JWT to that service. The exposed JWT may be used to attempt to mint installation access tokens during its validity window, subject to the GitHub App installation and permissions. The incoming webhook installation-lookup path is also affected, but exploitation of that path requires the valid incoming webhook secret for the target Repository CR. This issue is fixed in versions 0.37.8, 0.39.6, 0.42.1, and 0.48.0.

GHSA-f5f4-3hh4-f54m — Pipelines-as-Code GitHub App token request can be redirected via untrusted Enterprise Host header

Affected: Go: github.com/openshift-pipelines/pipelines-as-code

## Impact

Pipelines-as-Code installations using the GitHub App provider are vulnerable to GitHub App credential exfiltration through the webhook endpoint.

Affected versions accepted the `X-GitHub-Enterprise-Host` request header as the GitHub Enterprise API host during GitHub App token generation. For GitHub webhook events containing an `installation.id`, Pipelines-as-Code generated a GitHub App JWT and requested an installation access token before validating the webhook signature or checking that the Enterprise host matched the repository URL in the signed payload.

An attacker who can reach the Pipelines-as-Code webhook endpoint can send a crafted GitHub webhook payload containing an installation ID and set `X-GitHub-Enterprise-Host` to an attacker-controlled host. During token generation, the controller signs a GitHub App JWT locally and sends it to the selected API host. This can disclose the GitHub App JWT to the attacker-controlled service, allowing the attacker to attempt to mint GitHub App installation access tokens within the JWT validity window, subject to the GitHub App installation and permissions.

The incoming webhook flow also trusted `X-GitHub-Enterprise-Host` during GitHub App installation lookup and token generation. In that path, exploitation requires a valid incoming webhook secret for the target Repository CR.

## Patches

The fix validates the webhook signature before GitHub App token generation, verifies that `X-GitHub-Enterprise-Host` matches the rep…