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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-330378</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330378</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-330378</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330378</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-54096</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54096</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;File Browser is a file managing interface for uploading, deleting, previewing, renaming, and editing files within a specified directory. Prior to 2.63.7, `POST /api/share/&amp;lt;path&amp;gt;` accepts an authenticated request for an arbitrary path and stores a public share record without checking whether the target file currently exists. Later, when a file is created at that same path, the previously created public share immediately becomes valid and exposes the new file through `GET /api/public/dl/&amp;lt;hash&amp;gt;`. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.63.7.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;File Browser is a file managing interface for uploading, deleting, previewing, renaming, and editing files within a specified directory. Prior to 2.63.7, `POST /api/share/&amp;lt;path&amp;gt;` accepts an authenticated request for an arbitrary path and stores a public share record without checking whether the target file currently exists. Later, when a file is created at that same path, the previously created public share immediately becomes valid and exposes the new file through `GET /api/public/dl/&amp;lt;hash&amp;gt;`. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.63.7.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54096</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3q2p-72cj-682c — File Browser: Improper Access Control Occurs via Pre-Created Public Share for a Non-existent Path</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3q2p-72cj-682c</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2, Go: github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
This is similar vulnrability of **`CVE-2026-0035`**, which was fixed in Android `MediaProvider` with **high** severity. In the original Java issue, `MediaStore.createWriteRequest()` accepted attacker-controlled URIs and created a future grant even when the referenced media item did not exist yet. The Android fix added an existence check before creating the request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`filebrowser/filebrowser` has the analogous issue in Go. `POST /api/share/&amp;lt;path&amp;gt;` accepts an authenticated request for an arbitrary path and stores a public share record without checking whether the target file currently exists. Later, when a file is created at that same path, the previously created public share immediately becomes valid and exposes the new file through `GET /api/public/dl/&amp;lt;hash&amp;gt;`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The vulnerable create path is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `http/share.go`
- `sharePostHandler()`
- route: `POST /api/share/&amp;lt;path&amp;gt;`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`sharePostHandler()` only checks that the caller is authenticated and has share/download permissions. It then builds a `share.Link` directly from `r.URL.Path` and saves it:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
s = &amp;amp;share.Link{
    Path:         r.URL.Path,
    Hash:         str,
    Expire:       expire,
    UserID:       d.user.ID,
    PasswordHash: string(hash),
    Token:        token,
}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if err := d.store.Share.Save(s); err != nil {
    return http.StatusInternalServerError, err
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no `Stat`, `Exists`, or equivalent check before the public share record is committed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable consume path is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;-…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2, Go: github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
This is similar vulnrability of **`CVE-2026-0035`**, which was fixed in Android `MediaProvider` with **high** severity. In the original Java issue, `MediaStore.createWriteRequest()` accepted attacker-controlled URIs and created a future grant even when the referenced media item did not exist yet. The Android fix added an existence check before creating the request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`filebrowser/filebrowser` has the analogous issue in Go. `POST /api/share/&amp;lt;path&amp;gt;` accepts an authenticated request for an arbitrary path and stores a public share record without checking whether the target file currently exists. Later, when a file is created at that same path, the previously created public share immediately becomes valid and exposes the new file through `GET /api/public/dl/&amp;lt;hash&amp;gt;`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The vulnerable create path is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `http/share.go`
- `sharePostHandler()`
- route: `POST /api/share/&amp;lt;path&amp;gt;`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`sharePostHandler()` only checks that the caller is authenticated and has share/download permissions. It then builds a `share.Link` directly from `r.URL.Path` and saves it:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
s = &amp;amp;share.Link{
    Path:         r.URL.Path,
    Hash:         str,
    Expire:       expire,
    UserID:       d.user.ID,
    PasswordHash: string(hash),
    Token:        token,
}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if err := d.store.Share.Save(s); err != nil {
    return http.StatusInternalServerError, err
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no `Stat`, `Exists`, or equivalent check before the public share record is committed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable consume path is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;-…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3q2p-72cj-682c</guid>
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