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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 23:43:31 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-335729</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-335729</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-335729</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-335729</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-54063</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54063</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Excelize is a Go language library for reading and writing Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. Prior to 2.11.0, the checkSheet() function in github.com/xuri/excelize/v2 uses an attacker-controlled &amp;lt;row r=&amp;#34;N&amp;#34;&amp;gt; XML attribute value directly as the length argument to make([]xlsxRow, row) without validating it against the Excel row limit (TotalRows = 1,048,576). A specially crafted XLSX file can trigger two denial-of-service variants: (A) an out-of-memory process kill when r=2147483647 forces a ~16 GB allocation attempt, and (B) a runtime panic via out-of-bounds slice indexing when r=-1. Any service that opens attacker-supplied XLSX files and calls GetCellValue is affected. No authentication is required. This issue is fixed in version 2.11.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Excelize is a Go language library for reading and writing Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. Prior to 2.11.0, the checkSheet() function in github.com/xuri/excelize/v2 uses an attacker-controlled &amp;lt;row r=&amp;#34;N&amp;#34;&amp;gt; XML attribute value directly as the length argument to make([]xlsxRow, row) without validating it against the Excel row limit (TotalRows = 1,048,576). A specially crafted XLSX file can trigger two denial-of-service variants: (A) an out-of-memory process kill when r=2147483647 forces a ~16 GB allocation attempt, and (B) a runtime panic via out-of-bounds slice indexing when r=-1. Any service that opens attacker-supplied XLSX files and calls GetCellValue is affected. No authentication is required. This issue is fixed in version 2.11.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54063</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-h69g-9hx6-f3v4 — Excelize: Unbounded Row Index Allocation in Worksheet Parser (checkSheet OOM/Panic DoS)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h69g-9hx6-f3v4</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/xuri/excelize/v2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Unbounded Row Index Allocation in Worksheet Parser (checkSheet OOM/Panic DoS)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The `checkSheet()` function in `github.com/xuri/excelize/v2` uses an attacker-controlled `&amp;lt;row r=&amp;#34;N&amp;#34;&amp;gt;` XML attribute value directly as the length argument to `make([]xlsxRow, row)` without validating it against the Excel row limit (`TotalRows = 1,048,576`). A specially crafted XLSX file can trigger two denial-of-service variants: (A) an out-of-memory process kill when `r=2147483647` forces a ~16 GB allocation attempt, and (B) a runtime panic via out-of-bounds slice indexing when `r=-1`. Any service that opens attacker-supplied XLSX files and calls `GetCellValue` is affected. No authentication is required.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The vulnerable code path is triggered by calling `GetCellValue` (or any API that internally invokes `workSheetReader`) on an XLSX file containing a crafted worksheet row element.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Data flow (source → sink):**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. `excelize.go:186-193` — `OpenReader` reads attacker-controlled spreadsheet bytes.
2. `excelize.go:216-223` — ZIP reader is created and passed to `ReadZipReader`.
3. `lib.go:43-77` — ZIP entries are read into `fileList`; worksheet XML is stored by part name.
4. `excelize.go:228-229` — XML bytes are stored in `f.Pkg`.
5. `cell.go:71-79` — Public `GetCellValue` enters the worksheet value-read path.
6. `cell.go:1492-1494` — `getCellStringFunc` calls `workSheetReader`.
7. `excelize.go:313-324` — Worksheet XML is decoded into `xlsxWorksheet`.
8. `xmlWorksheet.go:3…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/xuri/excelize/v2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Unbounded Row Index Allocation in Worksheet Parser (checkSheet OOM/Panic DoS)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The `checkSheet()` function in `github.com/xuri/excelize/v2` uses an attacker-controlled `&amp;lt;row r=&amp;#34;N&amp;#34;&amp;gt;` XML attribute value directly as the length argument to `make([]xlsxRow, row)` without validating it against the Excel row limit (`TotalRows = 1,048,576`). A specially crafted XLSX file can trigger two denial-of-service variants: (A) an out-of-memory process kill when `r=2147483647` forces a ~16 GB allocation attempt, and (B) a runtime panic via out-of-bounds slice indexing when `r=-1`. Any service that opens attacker-supplied XLSX files and calls `GetCellValue` is affected. No authentication is required.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The vulnerable code path is triggered by calling `GetCellValue` (or any API that internally invokes `workSheetReader`) on an XLSX file containing a crafted worksheet row element.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Data flow (source → sink):**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. `excelize.go:186-193` — `OpenReader` reads attacker-controlled spreadsheet bytes.
2. `excelize.go:216-223` — ZIP reader is created and passed to `ReadZipReader`.
3. `lib.go:43-77` — ZIP entries are read into `fileList`; worksheet XML is stored by part name.
4. `excelize.go:228-229` — XML bytes are stored in `f.Pkg`.
5. `cell.go:71-79` — Public `GetCellValue` enters the worksheet value-read path.
6. `cell.go:1492-1494` — `getCellStringFunc` calls `workSheetReader`.
7. `excelize.go:313-324` — Worksheet XML is decoded into `xlsxWorksheet`.
8. `xmlWorksheet.go:3…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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