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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 12:54:46 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-365768</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-365768</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-365768</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-365768</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-53769</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-53769</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Avo is a framework to create admin panels for Ruby on Rails apps. From version 2.28.0 to before version 3.32.0, Avo&amp;#39;s direct attachment upload endpoint lacks server-side upload authorization and bypasses the documented field-level upload policy methods such as upload_{FIELD_ID}?. An authenticated Avo user who can reach the Avo attachment upload endpoint can replace or add attachment content, including binary content, filename, and content-type metadata, on a resolved record even when both update? and upload_&amp;lt;field&amp;gt;? policies deny the operation. This primarily affects multi-role Avo Pro/Advanced-style deployments where non-administrator or restricted operator users can reach Avo and per-record or per-field operations are expected to be enforced by policies. This issue has been patched in version 3.32.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Avo is a framework to create admin panels for Ruby on Rails apps. From version 2.28.0 to before version 3.32.0, Avo&amp;#39;s direct attachment upload endpoint lacks server-side upload authorization and bypasses the documented field-level upload policy methods such as upload_{FIELD_ID}?. An authenticated Avo user who can reach the Avo attachment upload endpoint can replace or add attachment content, including binary content, filename, and content-type metadata, on a resolved record even when both update? and upload_&amp;lt;field&amp;gt;? policies deny the operation. This primarily affects multi-role Avo Pro/Advanced-style deployments where non-administrator or restricted operator users can reach Avo and per-record or per-field operations are expected to be enforced by policies. This issue has been patched in version 3.32.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-53769</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-pqpw-cvm4-8mv9 — Avo: Direct attachment upload endpoint lacks upload authorization and bypasses field-level upload policy</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pqpw-cvm4-8mv9</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: avo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Avo&amp;#39;s direct attachment upload endpoint lacks server-side upload authorization and bypasses the documented field-level upload policy methods such as `upload_{FIELD_ID}?`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated Avo user who can reach the Avo attachment upload endpoint can replace or add attachment content, including binary content, filename, and content-type metadata, on a resolved record even when both `update?` and `upload_&amp;lt;field&amp;gt;?` policies deny the operation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This primarily affects multi-role Avo Pro/Advanced-style deployments where non-administrator or restricted operator users can reach Avo and per-record or per-field operations are expected to be enforced by policies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Avo exposes a direct attachment upload endpoint:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
POST /&amp;lt;avo-root&amp;gt;/avo_api/resources/:resource_name/:id/attachments/
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable code path is `Avo::AttachmentsController#create`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `app/controllers/avo/attachments_controller.rb:9-24`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Current behavior:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
def create
  blob = ActiveStorage::Blob.create_and_upload! io: params[:file].to_io, filename: params[:filename]
  association_name = BaseResource.valid_attachment_name(@record, params[:attachment_key])&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if association_name
    @record.send(association_name).attach blob
  elsif params[:key].blank?
    raise ActionController::BadRequest.new(...)
  end&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;render json: {
    url: main_app.url_for(blob),
    href: main_app.url_for(blob)
  }
end
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This endpoint creates an `ActiveStorage::Blob` before validating the requested…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: avo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Avo&amp;#39;s direct attachment upload endpoint lacks server-side upload authorization and bypasses the documented field-level upload policy methods such as `upload_{FIELD_ID}?`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated Avo user who can reach the Avo attachment upload endpoint can replace or add attachment content, including binary content, filename, and content-type metadata, on a resolved record even when both `update?` and `upload_&amp;lt;field&amp;gt;?` policies deny the operation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This primarily affects multi-role Avo Pro/Advanced-style deployments where non-administrator or restricted operator users can reach Avo and per-record or per-field operations are expected to be enforced by policies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Avo exposes a direct attachment upload endpoint:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
POST /&amp;lt;avo-root&amp;gt;/avo_api/resources/:resource_name/:id/attachments/
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable code path is `Avo::AttachmentsController#create`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `app/controllers/avo/attachments_controller.rb:9-24`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Current behavior:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
def create
  blob = ActiveStorage::Blob.create_and_upload! io: params[:file].to_io, filename: params[:filename]
  association_name = BaseResource.valid_attachment_name(@record, params[:attachment_key])&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if association_name
    @record.send(association_name).attach blob
  elsif params[:key].blank?
    raise ActionController::BadRequest.new(...)
  end&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;render json: {
    url: main_app.url_for(blob),
    href: main_app.url_for(blob)
  }
end
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This endpoint creates an `ActiveStorage::Blob` before validating the requested…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pqpw-cvm4-8mv9</guid>
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