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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 21:41:22 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BIT-parse-2026-53724 — Parse Server: Stored XSS via trailing-dot filename bypassing file upload extension blocklist</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-parse-2026-53724</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Bitnami: parse&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Parse Server is an open source backend that can be deployed to any infrastructure that can run Node.js. Prior to versions 8.6.79 and 9.9.1, the default file upload extension blocklist can be bypassed by appending a trailing dot to a filename whose extension would otherwise be blocked (e.g. poc.svg.). The trailing dot causes the extension parser to extract an empty string, which short-circuits the blocklist check, and the attacker-controlled Content-Type is forwarded to the storage adapter unchanged. Storage adapters that persist and serve the provided Content-Type (such as S3 or GCS) then serve the file with an active type such as image/svg+xml, enabling stored XSS when a victim opens the file URL. The default GridFS adapter is not affected because it sets X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff on responses. This issue has been patched in versions 8.6.79 and 9.9.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Bitnami: parse&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Parse Server is an open source backend that can be deployed to any infrastructure that can run Node.js. Prior to versions 8.6.79 and 9.9.1, the default file upload extension blocklist can be bypassed by appending a trailing dot to a filename whose extension would otherwise be blocked (e.g. poc.svg.). The trailing dot causes the extension parser to extract an empty string, which short-circuits the blocklist check, and the attacker-controlled Content-Type is forwarded to the storage adapter unchanged. Storage adapters that persist and serve the provided Content-Type (such as S3 or GCS) then serve the file with an active type such as image/svg+xml, enabling stored XSS when a victim opens the file URL. The default GridFS adapter is not affected because it sets X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff on responses. This issue has been patched in versions 8.6.79 and 9.9.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-parse-2026-53724</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-326944</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-326944</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-326944</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-326944</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-53724</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-53724</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Parse Server is an open source backend that can be deployed to any infrastructure that can run Node.js. Prior to versions 8.6.79 and 9.9.1-alpha.4, the default file upload extension blocklist can be bypassed by appending a trailing dot to a filename whose extension would otherwise be blocked (e.g. poc.svg.). The trailing dot causes the extension parser to extract an empty string, which short-circuits the blocklist check, and the attacker-controlled Content-Type is forwarded to the storage adapter unchanged. Storage adapters that persist and serve the provided Content-Type (such as S3 or GCS) then serve the file with an active type such as image/svg+xml, enabling stored XSS when a victim opens the file URL. The default GridFS adapter is not affected because it sets X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff on responses. This issue has been patched in versions 8.6.79 and 9.9.1-alpha.4.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Parse Server is an open source backend that can be deployed to any infrastructure that can run Node.js. Prior to versions 8.6.79 and 9.9.1-alpha.4, the default file upload extension blocklist can be bypassed by appending a trailing dot to a filename whose extension would otherwise be blocked (e.g. poc.svg.). The trailing dot causes the extension parser to extract an empty string, which short-circuits the blocklist check, and the attacker-controlled Content-Type is forwarded to the storage adapter unchanged. Storage adapters that persist and serve the provided Content-Type (such as S3 or GCS) then serve the file with an active type such as image/svg+xml, enabling stored XSS when a victim opens the file URL. The default GridFS adapter is not affected because it sets X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff on responses. This issue has been patched in versions 8.6.79 and 9.9.1-alpha.4.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-53724</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-7wqv-xjf3-x35v — parse-server: Stored XSS via trailing-dot filename bypassing file upload extension blocklist</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7wqv-xjf3-x35v</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: parse-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The default file upload extension blocklist can be bypassed by appending a trailing dot to a filename whose extension would otherwise be blocked (e.g. `poc.svg.`). The trailing dot causes the extension parser to extract an empty string, which short-circuits the blocklist check, and the attacker-controlled Content-Type is forwarded to the storage adapter unchanged. Storage adapters that persist and serve the provided Content-Type (such as S3 or GCS) then serve the file with an active type such as `image/svg+xml`, enabling stored XSS when a victim opens the file URL. The default GridFS adapter is not affected because it sets `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` on responses.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A filename ending in a dot is now treated as extensionless. When the parser produces an empty extension, the request handler falls back to validating the Content-Type subtype against the configured extension blocklist, matching the path that already catches truly extensionless uploads with a dangerous Content-Type. This is a follow-up to the previous fix [GHSA-vr5f-2r24-w5hc](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-vr5f-2r24-w5hc).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Configure the storage adapter or CDN to derive Content-Type from the filename extension instead of using the stored Content-Type, or replace the default blocklist with an explicit allowlist of needed file extensions.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: parse-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The default file upload extension blocklist can be bypassed by appending a trailing dot to a filename whose extension would otherwise be blocked (e.g. `poc.svg.`). The trailing dot causes the extension parser to extract an empty string, which short-circuits the blocklist check, and the attacker-controlled Content-Type is forwarded to the storage adapter unchanged. Storage adapters that persist and serve the provided Content-Type (such as S3 or GCS) then serve the file with an active type such as `image/svg+xml`, enabling stored XSS when a victim opens the file URL. The default GridFS adapter is not affected because it sets `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` on responses.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A filename ending in a dot is now treated as extensionless. When the parser produces an empty extension, the request handler falls back to validating the Content-Type subtype against the configured extension blocklist, matching the path that already catches truly extensionless uploads with a dangerous Content-Type. This is a follow-up to the previous fix [GHSA-vr5f-2r24-w5hc](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-vr5f-2r24-w5hc).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Configure the storage adapter or CDN to derive Content-Type from the filename extension instead of using the stored Content-Type, or replace the default blocklist with an explicit allowlist of needed file extensions.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7wqv-xjf3-x35v</guid>
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