https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 09 Oct 2026 19:39:32 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-335759 EUVD-2026-335759 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-335759 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-53653 <p>Grav is a file-based Web platform. Prior to 1.7.53 and 2.0.0-rc.8, Grav allows an unauthenticated visitor to exhaust server memory and CPU by requesting image derivatives with oversized dimensions through URL query image actions such as forceResize in Grav::fallbackUrl, which passes request parameters to ImageMedium magic actions without a dimension or pixel ceiling. This issue is fixed in versions 1.7.53 and 2.0.0-rc.8.</p> <p>Grav is a file-based Web platform. Prior to 1.7.53 and 2.0.0-rc.8, Grav allows an unauthenticated visitor to exhaust server memory and CPU by requesting image derivatives with oversized dimensions through URL query image actions such as forceResize in Grav::fallbackUrl, which passes request parameters to ImageMedium magic actions without a dimension or pixel ceiling. This issue is fixed in versions 1.7.53 and 2.0.0-rc.8.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-53653 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4x9g-vw65-vvf9 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: getgrav/grav</p> <p>### Summary An unauthenticated visitor exhausts server memory and CPU by requesting an image with oversized resize dimensions. One request drives a worker to several gigabytes of RAM and tens of seconds of CPU. A few concurrent requests take the host down.</p> <p>### Details `Grav::fallbackUrl()` (system/src/Grav/Common/Grav.php:800-804) loops over every query parameter and, when the name matches `ImageMedium::$magic_actions`, calls that method on the medium with the comma-split value as arguments:</p> <p>```php foreach ($uri-&gt;query(null, true) as $action =&gt; $params) { if (in_array($action, ImageMedium::$magic_actions, true)) { call_user_func_array([&amp;$medium, $action], explode(&#39;,&#39;, $params)); } } ```</p> <p>`forceResize` runs with `force=true`, so it sets the output size to the attacker&#39;s values with no clamp against the source or any ceiling. The `getgrav/image` GD adapter then calls `imagecreatetruecolor($w, $h)`. libgd allocates that buffer outside PHP&#39;s `emalloc`, so `memory_limit` does not cap it. Grav exposes no `system.images.max_width`/`max_height` setting.</p> <p>### PoC Any page that serves an image works. With a 200x150 source image:</p> <p>``` GET /home/test.png?forceResize=20000,20000 ```</p> <p>Measured on PHP 8.4.21 with `memory_limit=128M`:</p> <p>- peak worker RSS 3,109 MB - 21.9 s CPU - HTTP 200, 1.6 MB response</p> <p>`8000x8000` already needs ~244 MB. The cache key includes the dimensions, so varying them forces fresh work on every request.</p> <p>### Impact Unauthenticated denial of service…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: getgrav/grav</p> <p>### Summary An unauthenticated visitor exhausts server memory and CPU by requesting an image with oversized resize dimensions. One request drives a worker to several gigabytes of RAM and tens of seconds of CPU. A few concurrent requests take the host down.</p> <p>### Details `Grav::fallbackUrl()` (system/src/Grav/Common/Grav.php:800-804) loops over every query parameter and, when the name matches `ImageMedium::$magic_actions`, calls that method on the medium with the comma-split value as arguments:</p> <p>```php foreach ($uri-&gt;query(null, true) as $action =&gt; $params) { if (in_array($action, ImageMedium::$magic_actions, true)) { call_user_func_array([&amp;$medium, $action], explode(&#39;,&#39;, $params)); } } ```</p> <p>`forceResize` runs with `force=true`, so it sets the output size to the attacker&#39;s values with no clamp against the source or any ceiling. The `getgrav/image` GD adapter then calls `imagecreatetruecolor($w, $h)`. libgd allocates that buffer outside PHP&#39;s `emalloc`, so `memory_limit` does not cap it. Grav exposes no `system.images.max_width`/`max_height` setting.</p> <p>### PoC Any page that serves an image works. With a 200x150 source image:</p> <p>``` GET /home/test.png?forceResize=20000,20000 ```</p> <p>Measured on PHP 8.4.21 with `memory_limit=128M`:</p> <p>- peak worker RSS 3,109 MB - 21.9 s CPU - HTTP 200, 1.6 MB response</p> <p>`8000x8000` already needs ~244 MB. The cache key includes the dimensions, so varying them forces fresh work on every request.</p> <p>### Impact Unauthenticated denial of service…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4x9g-vw65-vvf9