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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-333644</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-333644</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-333644</description>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-53645</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-53645</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;FOSSBilling is a free, open-source billing and client management system. Versions prior to 0.8.0 allow a low-privileged staff account to grant arbitrary module permissions to itself through the admin API, resulting in persistent privilege escalation. A staff user that only has `staff.create_and_edit_staff` can call `/api/admin/staff/permissions_update` targeting their own account and write any permission structure, bypassing the intended role-based access control boundary. Version 0.8.0 patches the issue. Some workarounds are available. Restrict the `staff.create_and_edit_staff` permission to only highly trusted staff members and/or use a reverse proxy or WAF to restrict access to `/api/admin/staff/permissions_update` to specific trusted roles.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;FOSSBilling is a free, open-source billing and client management system. Versions prior to 0.8.0 allow a low-privileged staff account to grant arbitrary module permissions to itself through the admin API, resulting in persistent privilege escalation. A staff user that only has `staff.create_and_edit_staff` can call `/api/admin/staff/permissions_update` targeting their own account and write any permission structure, bypassing the intended role-based access control boundary. Version 0.8.0 patches the issue. Some workarounds are available. Restrict the `staff.create_and_edit_staff` permission to only highly trusted staff members and/or use a reverse proxy or WAF to restrict access to `/api/admin/staff/permissions_update` to specific trusted roles.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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