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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-327357</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-327357</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-327357</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-327357</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-53609</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-53609</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system. In versions up to and including 4.30.0, `apos.util.set()` traverses dot-notation paths without sanitizing `__proto__`, allowing an authenticated editor to write arbitrary values to `Object.prototype` via the `$pullAll` patch operator. A confirmed gadget in `publicApiCheck()` causes this to bypass authorization on all piece-type REST API endpoints for every subsequent unauthenticated request, for the lifetime of the Node.js process. As of time of publication, no known patched versions are available.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system. In versions up to and including 4.30.0, `apos.util.set()` traverses dot-notation paths without sanitizing `__proto__`, allowing an authenticated editor to write arbitrary values to `Object.prototype` via the `$pullAll` patch operator. A confirmed gadget in `publicApiCheck()` causes this to bypass authorization on all piece-type REST API endpoints for every subsequent unauthenticated request, for the lifetime of the Node.js process. As of time of publication, no known patched versions are available.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-53609</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-6h5j-32cf-4253 — Apostrophe has Server-Side Prototype Pollution in apos.util.set via patch operators that leads to process-wide authoriz…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6h5j-32cf-4253</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: apostrophe&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;lt;img width=&amp;#34;1919&amp;#34; height=&amp;#34;1046&amp;#34; alt=&amp;#34;proto&amp;#34; src=&amp;#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c5c69718-6448-448d-b64b-e3db41ab6ff6&amp;#34; /&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`apos.util.set()` traverses dot-notation paths without sanitizing `__proto__`, allowing an authenticated editor to write arbitrary values to `Object.prototype` via the `$pullAll` patch operator.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A confirmed gadget in `publicApiCheck()` causes this to bypass authorization on all piece-type REST API endpoints for every subsequent unauthenticated request, for the lifetime of the Node.js process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Root Cause — `apos.util.set()` (`modules/@apostrophecms/util/index.js` ~line 800)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The function splits a dot-notation path and traverses properties without rejecting `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
set(o, path, v) {
  path = path.split(&amp;#39;.&amp;#39;);
  for (i = 0; i &amp;lt; path.length - 1; i++) {
    o = o[path[i]];   // when path[i] === &amp;#39;__proto__&amp;#39;, o becomes Object.prototype
  }
  o[path[i]] = v;     // mutates Object.prototype
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Source — `implementPatchOperators()` (`modules/@apostrophecms/schema/index.js` ~line 1737)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;User-controlled keys from the `$pullAll` operator are passed directly to `apos.util.set()`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
_.each(patch.$pullAll, function(val, key) {
  cloneOriginalBase(key);               // uses _.has (hasOwnProperty)
  self.apos.util.set(patch, key, ...);  // key is fully attacker-controlled
});
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`cloneOriginalBase()` does not sanitize `__proto__` because `_.has()` performs an own-propert…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: apostrophe&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;lt;img width=&amp;#34;1919&amp;#34; height=&amp;#34;1046&amp;#34; alt=&amp;#34;proto&amp;#34; src=&amp;#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c5c69718-6448-448d-b64b-e3db41ab6ff6&amp;#34; /&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`apos.util.set()` traverses dot-notation paths without sanitizing `__proto__`, allowing an authenticated editor to write arbitrary values to `Object.prototype` via the `$pullAll` patch operator.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A confirmed gadget in `publicApiCheck()` causes this to bypass authorization on all piece-type REST API endpoints for every subsequent unauthenticated request, for the lifetime of the Node.js process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Root Cause — `apos.util.set()` (`modules/@apostrophecms/util/index.js` ~line 800)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The function splits a dot-notation path and traverses properties without rejecting `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
set(o, path, v) {
  path = path.split(&amp;#39;.&amp;#39;);
  for (i = 0; i &amp;lt; path.length - 1; i++) {
    o = o[path[i]];   // when path[i] === &amp;#39;__proto__&amp;#39;, o becomes Object.prototype
  }
  o[path[i]] = v;     // mutates Object.prototype
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Source — `implementPatchOperators()` (`modules/@apostrophecms/schema/index.js` ~line 1737)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;User-controlled keys from the `$pullAll` operator are passed directly to `apos.util.set()`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
_.each(patch.$pullAll, function(val, key) {
  cloneOriginalBase(key);               // uses _.has (hasOwnProperty)
  self.apos.util.set(patch, key, ...);  // key is fully attacker-controlled
});
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`cloneOriginalBase()` does not sanitize `__proto__` because `_.has()` performs an own-propert…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6h5j-32cf-4253</guid>
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