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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-338097</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338097</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-338097</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338097</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-53516</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-53516</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Better Auth is an authentication and authorization library for TypeScript. Prior to 1.6.11, Better Auth&amp;#39;s OAuth callback auto-link gate in handleOAuthUserInfo accepts implicit account linking when the OAuth provider asserts email_verified: true without requiring the local user row&amp;#39;s emailVerified field to also be true, allowing an attacker who pre-registers a victim email through /sign-up/email to bind the victim&amp;#39;s OAuth identity to the attacker&amp;#39;s account. The same primitive affects one-tap, and emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification: true does not mitigate the link-time verification change. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.11.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Better Auth is an authentication and authorization library for TypeScript. Prior to 1.6.11, Better Auth&amp;#39;s OAuth callback auto-link gate in handleOAuthUserInfo accepts implicit account linking when the OAuth provider asserts email_verified: true without requiring the local user row&amp;#39;s emailVerified field to also be true, allowing an attacker who pre-registers a victim email through /sign-up/email to bind the victim&amp;#39;s OAuth identity to the attacker&amp;#39;s account. The same primitive affects one-tap, and emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification: true does not mitigate the link-time verification change. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.11.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-53516</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-g38m-r43w-p2q7 — Better Auth has an account takeover issue via OAuth auto-link to unverified pre-registered email</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g38m-r43w-p2q7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: better-auth&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Am I affected?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users are affected if all of the following are true:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Their application uses `better-auth` at a version `&amp;lt; 1.6.11` on the stable line, or any current `next` pre-release.
- `emailAndPassword.enabled: true` is set in their application&amp;#39;s `betterAuth({ ... })` configuration.
- At least one OAuth or SSO provider is configured (any built-in social provider, or `genericOAuth(...)`, or any provider via `@better-auth/sso`).
- `account.accountLinking.disableImplicitLinking` is not set to `true`.
- `account.accountLinking.enabled` is not set to `false`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Setting either `disableImplicitLinking: true` or `enabled: false` closes the hole at the cost of breaking the standard &amp;#34;add another login method&amp;#34; UX. `emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification: true` does not mitigate, because the link-time `emailVerified` flip promotes the attacker&amp;#39;s row to verified, after which the password login becomes usable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Upgrade to `better-auth@1.6.11` or later.
2. If developers cannot upgrade, see workarounds below.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The OAuth callback&amp;#39;s auto-link gate in `handleOAuthUserInfo` admits an implicit account link whenever the provider asserts `email_verified: true`, without requiring the local user row&amp;#39;s `emailVerified` to also be `true`. An attacker who pre-registers a victim&amp;#39;s email through `/sign-up/email` (which writes a row with `emailVerified: false`) can have the victim&amp;#39;s later OAuth identity bound to the attacker&amp;#39;s user row, granting both a password login and t…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: better-auth&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Am I affected?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users are affected if all of the following are true:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Their application uses `better-auth` at a version `&amp;lt; 1.6.11` on the stable line, or any current `next` pre-release.
- `emailAndPassword.enabled: true` is set in their application&amp;#39;s `betterAuth({ ... })` configuration.
- At least one OAuth or SSO provider is configured (any built-in social provider, or `genericOAuth(...)`, or any provider via `@better-auth/sso`).
- `account.accountLinking.disableImplicitLinking` is not set to `true`.
- `account.accountLinking.enabled` is not set to `false`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Setting either `disableImplicitLinking: true` or `enabled: false` closes the hole at the cost of breaking the standard &amp;#34;add another login method&amp;#34; UX. `emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification: true` does not mitigate, because the link-time `emailVerified` flip promotes the attacker&amp;#39;s row to verified, after which the password login becomes usable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Upgrade to `better-auth@1.6.11` or later.
2. If developers cannot upgrade, see workarounds below.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The OAuth callback&amp;#39;s auto-link gate in `handleOAuthUserInfo` admits an implicit account link whenever the provider asserts `email_verified: true`, without requiring the local user row&amp;#39;s `emailVerified` to also be `true`. An attacker who pre-registers a victim&amp;#39;s email through `/sign-up/email` (which writes a row with `emailVerified: false`) can have the victim&amp;#39;s later OAuth identity bound to the attacker&amp;#39;s user row, granting both a password login and t…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g38m-r43w-p2q7</guid>
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