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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 12:23:04 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-338140</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338140</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-338140</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338140</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-53513</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-53513</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Better Auth is an authentication and authorization library for TypeScript. Prior to 1.6.11, the @better-auth/sso plugin&amp;#39;s POST /sso/register and POST /sso/update-provider endpoints accept attacker-controlled oidcConfig.userInfoEndpoint, tokenEndpoint, and jwksEndpoint URLs when skipDiscovery: true is set, store them on the ssoProvider row without origin validation, and fetch them during OIDC callback, allowing non-blind server-side request forgery and possible account linking when trustEmailVerified: true is configured. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.11.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Better Auth is an authentication and authorization library for TypeScript. Prior to 1.6.11, the @better-auth/sso plugin&amp;#39;s POST /sso/register and POST /sso/update-provider endpoints accept attacker-controlled oidcConfig.userInfoEndpoint, tokenEndpoint, and jwksEndpoint URLs when skipDiscovery: true is set, store them on the ssoProvider row without origin validation, and fetch them during OIDC callback, allowing non-blind server-side request forgery and possible account linking when trustEmailVerified: true is configured. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.11.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-53513</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-5rr4-8452-hf4v — @better-auth/sso provider registration has server-side request forgery via unvalidated OIDC endpoints</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5rr4-8452-hf4v</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @better-auth/sso&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Am I affected?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users are affected if all of the following are true:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Their application uses `@better-auth/sso` at a version `&amp;gt;= 0.1.0, &amp;lt; 1.6.11` on the stable line, or any `1.7.0-beta.x` on the pre-release line.
- The `sso()` plugin is added to their application&amp;#39;s `betterAuth({ plugins: [...] })` array.
- Any user with a valid Better Auth session can reach `POST /sso/register` (the plugin&amp;#39;s default gate accepts any session).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For the non-blind SSRF impact (full IAM credential or internal HTTP body exfiltration), no further configuration is required.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For the account takeover escalation, additionally:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Developers set `sso({ trustEmailVerified: true, ... })`.
- The developer&amp;#39;s application deployment has accounts whose `email` overlaps with attacker-chosen domains.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If developers do not enable the SSO plugin, their application is not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Upgrade to `@better-auth/sso@1.6.11` or later.
2. If developers cannot upgrade, see workarounds below.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `@better-auth/sso` plugin&amp;#39;s `POST /sso/register` endpoint accepts attacker-controlled `oidcConfig.userInfoEndpoint`, `tokenEndpoint`, and `jwksEndpoint` URLs when `skipDiscovery: true` is set, persists them on the `ssoProvider` row without origin validation, then issues server-side fetches to those URLs during the OIDC callback. The fetched response body is reflected through the user profile, producing a non-blind SSRF reachable by any authenticated session. The same primitive exists on `POST /sso/upd…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @better-auth/sso&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Am I affected?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users are affected if all of the following are true:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Their application uses `@better-auth/sso` at a version `&amp;gt;= 0.1.0, &amp;lt; 1.6.11` on the stable line, or any `1.7.0-beta.x` on the pre-release line.
- The `sso()` plugin is added to their application&amp;#39;s `betterAuth({ plugins: [...] })` array.
- Any user with a valid Better Auth session can reach `POST /sso/register` (the plugin&amp;#39;s default gate accepts any session).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For the non-blind SSRF impact (full IAM credential or internal HTTP body exfiltration), no further configuration is required.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For the account takeover escalation, additionally:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Developers set `sso({ trustEmailVerified: true, ... })`.
- The developer&amp;#39;s application deployment has accounts whose `email` overlaps with attacker-chosen domains.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If developers do not enable the SSO plugin, their application is not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Upgrade to `@better-auth/sso@1.6.11` or later.
2. If developers cannot upgrade, see workarounds below.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `@better-auth/sso` plugin&amp;#39;s `POST /sso/register` endpoint accepts attacker-controlled `oidcConfig.userInfoEndpoint`, `tokenEndpoint`, and `jwksEndpoint` URLs when `skipDiscovery: true` is set, persists them on the `ssoProvider` row without origin validation, then issues server-side fetches to those URLs during the OIDC callback. The fetched response body is reflected through the user profile, producing a non-blind SSRF reachable by any authenticated session. The same primitive exists on `POST /sso/upd…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5rr4-8452-hf4v</guid>
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