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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-357507</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-357507</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-357507</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-357507</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-53424</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-53424</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion&amp;#39;s NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion&amp;#39;s subject.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion&amp;#39;s NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion&amp;#39;s subject.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-53424</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-5x87-gf34-8ww7</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5x87-gf34-8ww7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion&amp;#39;s NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion&amp;#39;s subject.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects samly: from v0.3.0 onward.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion&amp;#39;s NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion&amp;#39;s subject.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects samly: from v0.3.0 onward.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5x87-gf34-8ww7</guid>
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