<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 03:05:36 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-356489</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-356489</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-356489</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-356489</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-52739</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-52739</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a malicious block producer can terminate zebrad by placing the same shielded transaction in a non-finalized parent block and its child. In zebra-state/src/service/non_finalized_state/chain.rs, Chain::push originally inserted the transaction hash into tx_loc_by_hash and asserted uniqueness before updating shielded data and running the duplicate Sprout, Sapling, or Orchard nullifier checks. The repeated transaction therefore reached the transactions must be unique within a single chain assertion before contextual validation could reject it cleanly. Zebra release builds use panic equals abort, so the reachable assertion terminates the entire process; exploitation requires either two consecutive attacker-mined blocks or an attacker-mined child immediately after an honest block includes the attacker&amp;#39;s shielded transaction. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a malicious block producer can terminate zebrad by placing the same shielded transaction in a non-finalized parent block and its child. In zebra-state/src/service/non_finalized_state/chain.rs, Chain::push originally inserted the transaction hash into tx_loc_by_hash and asserted uniqueness before updating shielded data and running the duplicate Sprout, Sapling, or Orchard nullifier checks. The repeated transaction therefore reached the transactions must be unique within a single chain assertion before contextual validation could reject it cleanly. Zebra release builds use panic equals abort, so the reachable assertion terminates the entire process; exploitation requires either two consecutive attacker-mined blocks or an attacker-mined child immediately after an honest block includes the attacker&amp;#39;s shielded transaction. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-52739</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hhm7-qrv5-h4r6 — Zebra: Repeated Non-Finalized Shielded Transaction Aborts Zebra Before Duplicate-Nullifier Rejection</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hhm7-qrv5-h4r6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: zebra-state, crates.io: zebrad&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Am I affected&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;You are affected if:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. You run `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`.
2. Your node processes blocks past the checkpoint height (non-finalized state is active).
3. The network has NU5 or later activated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All default configurations are affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Chain::push` in the non-finalized state updates the transaction-location index (`tx_loc_by_hash`) before it runs the duplicate shielded-nullifier guard. When an invalid child block repeats a shielded transaction from its non-finalized parent, the `assert_eq!(prior_pair, None, &amp;#34;transactions must be unique within a single chain&amp;#34;)` fires before the contextual validation that would cleanly reject the duplicate. Under Zebra&amp;#39;s `panic = &amp;#34;abort&amp;#34;` release profile, this terminates the entire node process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The block should be rejected with a duplicate-nullifier contextual validation error. Instead, the ordering of index updates within `Chain::push` causes the process to abort.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `zebra-state/src/service/non_finalized_state/chain.rs:1608-1628`, the block push sequence is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Insert transaction hash into `tx_loc_by_hash` with `assert_eq!` on uniqueness
2. Update transparent outputs and inputs
3. Update shielded data (JoinSplit, Sapling, Orchard) — including nullifier uniqueness checks&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The shielded nullifier uniqueness check at step 3 would correctly reject the duplicate transaction. But the `assert_eq!` at step 1 fires first because the transaction hash is already in `tx_loc_by_hash` from the p…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: zebra-state, crates.io: zebrad&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Am I affected&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;You are affected if:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. You run `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`.
2. Your node processes blocks past the checkpoint height (non-finalized state is active).
3. The network has NU5 or later activated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All default configurations are affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Chain::push` in the non-finalized state updates the transaction-location index (`tx_loc_by_hash`) before it runs the duplicate shielded-nullifier guard. When an invalid child block repeats a shielded transaction from its non-finalized parent, the `assert_eq!(prior_pair, None, &amp;#34;transactions must be unique within a single chain&amp;#34;)` fires before the contextual validation that would cleanly reject the duplicate. Under Zebra&amp;#39;s `panic = &amp;#34;abort&amp;#34;` release profile, this terminates the entire node process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The block should be rejected with a duplicate-nullifier contextual validation error. Instead, the ordering of index updates within `Chain::push` causes the process to abort.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `zebra-state/src/service/non_finalized_state/chain.rs:1608-1628`, the block push sequence is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Insert transaction hash into `tx_loc_by_hash` with `assert_eq!` on uniqueness
2. Update transparent outputs and inputs
3. Update shielded data (JoinSplit, Sapling, Orchard) — including nullifier uniqueness checks&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The shielded nullifier uniqueness check at step 3 would correctly reject the duplicate transaction. But the `assert_eq!` at step 1 fires first because the transaction hash is already in `tx_loc_by_hash` from the p…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hhm7-qrv5-h4r6</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
