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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 15:51:31 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-10820</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-10820</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-10820</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-10820</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-breezy-CVE-2026-52726 — Dulwich's submodule path traversal in porcelain.submodule_update / porcelain.clone(recurse_submodules=True) yields RCE…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-breezy-cve-2026-52726</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: breezy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update`, and by extension `porcelain.clone(..., recurse_submodules=True)`, materializes attacker-controlled submodule paths from a crafted upstream repository without path validation. A malicious `.gitmodules` plus a matching tree gitlink whose `path` is `.git/hooks` (or any other directory inside the parent repository&amp;#39;s `.git` directory) causes the attacker&amp;#39;s submodule tree contents to be written directly into the victim&amp;#39;s `.git/hooks/` directory, preserving executable mode bits. The dropped executables are then run by any subsequent `git` or `dulwich` command that invokes the matching hook, resulting in arbitrary code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the dulwich equivalent of the upstream Git fixes for CVE-2024-32002 / CVE-2024-32004, which were never propagated into dulwich&amp;#39;s separately implemented submodule porcelain.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Package:** `dulwich` (PyPI)
- **Affected versions:** `&amp;gt;=0.23.2, &amp;lt;1.2.5`
- **Affected platforms:** all (Linux, macOS, Windows). Exploitation does not require a case-insensitive or NTFS filesystem, because the path written is a literal `.git/hooks` rather than a case- or short-name-aliased form.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected entry points:
- `dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update(repo, init=True, recursive=True)`
- `dulwich.porcelain.clone(source, target, recurse_submodules=True)`
- `dulwich submodule update` CLI / `dulwich clone --recurse-submodules` CLI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Vulnerable code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The submodule path from the tree&amp;#39;s gitlink entry (and match…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: breezy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update`, and by extension `porcelain.clone(..., recurse_submodules=True)`, materializes attacker-controlled submodule paths from a crafted upstream repository without path validation. A malicious `.gitmodules` plus a matching tree gitlink whose `path` is `.git/hooks` (or any other directory inside the parent repository&amp;#39;s `.git` directory) causes the attacker&amp;#39;s submodule tree contents to be written directly into the victim&amp;#39;s `.git/hooks/` directory, preserving executable mode bits. The dropped executables are then run by any subsequent `git` or `dulwich` command that invokes the matching hook, resulting in arbitrary code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the dulwich equivalent of the upstream Git fixes for CVE-2024-32002 / CVE-2024-32004, which were never propagated into dulwich&amp;#39;s separately implemented submodule porcelain.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Package:** `dulwich` (PyPI)
- **Affected versions:** `&amp;gt;=0.23.2, &amp;lt;1.2.5`
- **Affected platforms:** all (Linux, macOS, Windows). Exploitation does not require a case-insensitive or NTFS filesystem, because the path written is a literal `.git/hooks` rather than a case- or short-name-aliased form.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected entry points:
- `dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update(repo, init=True, recursive=True)`
- `dulwich.porcelain.clone(source, target, recurse_submodules=True)`
- `dulwich submodule update` CLI / `dulwich clone --recurse-submodules` CLI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Vulnerable code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The submodule path from the tree&amp;#39;s gitlink entry (and match…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-breezy-cve-2026-52726</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Withdrawn: CLEANSTART-2026-MI51590 — Security fixes in kserve-storage-controller 0.19.0-r0</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-mi51590</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Withdrawn by the publisher.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CleanStart: kserve-storage-controller&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Package kserve-storage-controller version 0.19.0-r0 fixes 91 vulnerabilities: CVE-2024-12254, CVE-2024-12718, CVE-2024-6232, CVE-2024-7592, CVE-2024-9287...&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Withdrawn by the publisher.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CleanStart: kserve-storage-controller&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Package kserve-storage-controller version 0.19.0-r0 fixes 91 vulnerabilities: CVE-2024-12254, CVE-2024-12718, CVE-2024-6232, CVE-2024-7592, CVE-2024-9287...&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-mi51590</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-326591</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-326591</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-326591</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-326591</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-52726</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-52726</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Dulwich is a pure-Python implementation of the Git file formats and protocols. Starting in version 0.23.2 and prior to version 1.2.5, `dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update`, and by extension `porcelain.clone(..., recurse_submodules=True)`, materializes attacker-controlled submodule paths from a crafted upstream repository without path validation. A malicious `.gitmodules` plus a matching tree gitlink whose `path` is `.git/hooks` (or any other directory inside the parent repository&amp;#39;s `.git` directory) causes the attacker&amp;#39;s submodule tree contents to be written directly into the victim&amp;#39;s `.git/hooks/` directory, preserving executable mode bits. The dropped executables are then run by any subsequent `git` or `dulwich` command that invokes the matching hook, resulting in arbitrary code execution. This is the dulwich equivalent of the upstream Git fixes for CVE-2024-32002 / CVE-2024-32004, which were never propagated into dulwich&amp;#39;s separately implemented submodule porcelain. Version 1.2.5 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Dulwich is a pure-Python implementation of the Git file formats and protocols. Starting in version 0.23.2 and prior to version 1.2.5, `dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update`, and by extension `porcelain.clone(..., recurse_submodules=True)`, materializes attacker-controlled submodule paths from a crafted upstream repository without path validation. A malicious `.gitmodules` plus a matching tree gitlink whose `path` is `.git/hooks` (or any other directory inside the parent repository&amp;#39;s `.git` directory) causes the attacker&amp;#39;s submodule tree contents to be written directly into the victim&amp;#39;s `.git/hooks/` directory, preserving executable mode bits. The dropped executables are then run by any subsequent `git` or `dulwich` command that invokes the matching hook, resulting in arbitrary code execution. This is the dulwich equivalent of the upstream Git fixes for CVE-2024-32002 / CVE-2024-32004, which were never propagated into dulwich&amp;#39;s separately implemented submodule porcelain. Version 1.2.5 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-52726</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-gfhv-vqv2-4544 — Dulwich's submodule path traversal in porcelain.submodule_update / porcelain.clone(recurse_submodules=True) yields RCE…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gfhv-vqv2-4544</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: dulwich&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update`, and by extension `porcelain.clone(..., recurse_submodules=True)`, materializes attacker-controlled submodule paths from a crafted upstream repository without path validation. A malicious `.gitmodules` plus a matching tree gitlink whose `path` is `.git/hooks` (or any other directory inside the parent repository&amp;#39;s `.git` directory) causes the attacker&amp;#39;s submodule tree contents to be written directly into the victim&amp;#39;s `.git/hooks/` directory, preserving executable mode bits. The dropped executables are then run by any subsequent `git` or `dulwich` command that invokes the matching hook, resulting in arbitrary code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the dulwich equivalent of the upstream Git fixes for CVE-2024-32002 / CVE-2024-32004, which were never propagated into dulwich&amp;#39;s separately implemented submodule porcelain.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Package:** `dulwich` (PyPI)
- **Affected versions:** `&amp;gt;=0.23.2, &amp;lt;1.2.5`
- **Affected platforms:** all (Linux, macOS, Windows). Exploitation does not require a case-insensitive or NTFS filesystem, because the path written is a literal `.git/hooks` rather than a case- or short-name-aliased form.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected entry points:
- `dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update(repo, init=True, recursive=True)`
- `dulwich.porcelain.clone(source, target, recurse_submodules=True)`
- `dulwich submodule update` CLI / `dulwich clone --recurse-submodules` CLI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Vulnerable code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The submodule path from the tree&amp;#39;s gitlink entry (and match…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: dulwich&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update`, and by extension `porcelain.clone(..., recurse_submodules=True)`, materializes attacker-controlled submodule paths from a crafted upstream repository without path validation. A malicious `.gitmodules` plus a matching tree gitlink whose `path` is `.git/hooks` (or any other directory inside the parent repository&amp;#39;s `.git` directory) causes the attacker&amp;#39;s submodule tree contents to be written directly into the victim&amp;#39;s `.git/hooks/` directory, preserving executable mode bits. The dropped executables are then run by any subsequent `git` or `dulwich` command that invokes the matching hook, resulting in arbitrary code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the dulwich equivalent of the upstream Git fixes for CVE-2024-32002 / CVE-2024-32004, which were never propagated into dulwich&amp;#39;s separately implemented submodule porcelain.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Package:** `dulwich` (PyPI)
- **Affected versions:** `&amp;gt;=0.23.2, &amp;lt;1.2.5`
- **Affected platforms:** all (Linux, macOS, Windows). Exploitation does not require a case-insensitive or NTFS filesystem, because the path written is a literal `.git/hooks` rather than a case- or short-name-aliased form.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected entry points:
- `dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update(repo, init=True, recursive=True)`
- `dulwich.porcelain.clone(source, target, recurse_submodules=True)`
- `dulwich submodule update` CLI / `dulwich clone --recurse-submodules` CLI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Vulnerable code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The submodule path from the tree&amp;#39;s gitlink entry (and match…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gfhv-vqv2-4544</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2465 — Dulwich's submodule path traversal in porcelain.submodule_update / porcelain.clone(recurse_submodules=True) yields RCE…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2465</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: dulwich&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update`, and by extension `porcelain.clone(..., recurse_submodules=True)`, materializes attacker-controlled submodule paths from a crafted upstream repository without path validation. A malicious `.gitmodules` plus a matching tree gitlink whose `path` is `.git/hooks` (or any other directory inside the parent repository&amp;#39;s `.git` directory) causes the attacker&amp;#39;s submodule tree contents to be written directly into the victim&amp;#39;s `.git/hooks/` directory, preserving executable mode bits. The dropped executables are then run by any subsequent `git` or `dulwich` command that invokes the matching hook, resulting in arbitrary code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the dulwich equivalent of the upstream Git fixes for CVE-2024-32002 / CVE-2024-32004, which were never propagated into dulwich&amp;#39;s separately implemented submodule porcelain.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Package:** `dulwich` (PyPI)
- **Affected versions:** `&amp;gt;=0.23.2, &amp;lt;1.2.5`
- **Affected platforms:** all (Linux, macOS, Windows). Exploitation does not require a case-insensitive or NTFS filesystem, because the path written is a literal `.git/hooks` rather than a case- or short-name-aliased form.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected entry points:
- `dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update(repo, init=True, recursive=True)`
- `dulwich.porcelain.clone(source, target, recurse_submodules=True)`
- `dulwich submodule update` CLI / `dulwich clone --recurse-submodules` CLI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Vulnerable code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The submodule path from the tree&amp;#39;s gitlink entry (and match…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: dulwich&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update`, and by extension `porcelain.clone(..., recurse_submodules=True)`, materializes attacker-controlled submodule paths from a crafted upstream repository without path validation. A malicious `.gitmodules` plus a matching tree gitlink whose `path` is `.git/hooks` (or any other directory inside the parent repository&amp;#39;s `.git` directory) causes the attacker&amp;#39;s submodule tree contents to be written directly into the victim&amp;#39;s `.git/hooks/` directory, preserving executable mode bits. The dropped executables are then run by any subsequent `git` or `dulwich` command that invokes the matching hook, resulting in arbitrary code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the dulwich equivalent of the upstream Git fixes for CVE-2024-32002 / CVE-2024-32004, which were never propagated into dulwich&amp;#39;s separately implemented submodule porcelain.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Package:** `dulwich` (PyPI)
- **Affected versions:** `&amp;gt;=0.23.2, &amp;lt;1.2.5`
- **Affected platforms:** all (Linux, macOS, Windows). Exploitation does not require a case-insensitive or NTFS filesystem, because the path written is a literal `.git/hooks` rather than a case- or short-name-aliased form.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected entry points:
- `dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update(repo, init=True, recursive=True)`
- `dulwich.porcelain.clone(source, target, recurse_submodules=True)`
- `dulwich submodule update` CLI / `dulwich clone --recurse-submodules` CLI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Vulnerable code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The submodule path from the tree&amp;#39;s gitlink entry (and match…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2465</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-52726</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-52726</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: dulwich, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: dulwich, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: dulwich, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: dulwich, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: dulwich, Ubuntu:25.10: dulwich, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: dulwich&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Dulwich is a pure-Python implementation of the Git file formats and protocols. Starting in version 0.23.2 and prior to version 1.2.5, `dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update`, and by extension `porcelain.clone(..., recurse_submodules=True)`, materializes attacker-controlled submodule paths from a crafted upstream repository without path validation. A malicious `.gitmodules` plus a matching tree gitlink whose `path` is `.git/hooks` (or any other directory inside the parent repository&amp;#39;s `.git` directory) causes the attacker&amp;#39;s submodule tree contents to be written directly into the victim&amp;#39;s `.git/hooks/` directory, preserving executable mode bits. The dropped executables are then run by any subsequent `git` or `dulwich` command that invokes the matching hook, resulting in arbitrary code execution. This is the dulwich equivalent of the upstream Git fixes for CVE-2024-32002 / CVE-2024-32004, which were never propagated into dulwich&amp;#39;s separately implemented submodule porcelain. Version 1.2.5 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: dulwich, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: dulwich, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: dulwich, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: dulwich, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: dulwich, Ubuntu:25.10: dulwich, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: dulwich&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Dulwich is a pure-Python implementation of the Git file formats and protocols. Starting in version 0.23.2 and prior to version 1.2.5, `dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update`, and by extension `porcelain.clone(..., recurse_submodules=True)`, materializes attacker-controlled submodule paths from a crafted upstream repository without path validation. A malicious `.gitmodules` plus a matching tree gitlink whose `path` is `.git/hooks` (or any other directory inside the parent repository&amp;#39;s `.git` directory) causes the attacker&amp;#39;s submodule tree contents to be written directly into the victim&amp;#39;s `.git/hooks/` directory, preserving executable mode bits. The dropped executables are then run by any subsequent `git` or `dulwich` command that invokes the matching hook, resulting in arbitrary code execution. This is the dulwich equivalent of the upstream Git fixes for CVE-2024-32002 / CVE-2024-32004, which were never propagated into dulwich&amp;#39;s separately implemented submodule porcelain. Version 1.2.5 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-52726</guid>
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