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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 07:29:43 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-368672</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-368672</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-368672</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-368672</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-52724</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-52724</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Kuma is a modern Envoy-based service mesh that can run on every cloud across both Kubernetes and VMs. Prior to 2.7.26, 2.9.16, 2.11.14, 2.12.11, and 2.13.7, Universal mode kuma-dp connections to an HTTPS control plane disable TLS peer verification when --ca-cert-file is not supplied and KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT is unset. The dataplane authentication token is sent over the unverified connection, allowing an on-path attacker to intercept the token, impersonate the control plane, inject a forged bootstrap configuration, and take over the proxy. Standard Kubernetes installations created by kumactl install control-plane or the official Helm chart are unaffected because the mutating admission webhook injects KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT into each sidecar. This issue is fixed in versions 2.7.26, 2.9.16, 2.11.14, 2.12.11, and 2.13.7.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Kuma is a modern Envoy-based service mesh that can run on every cloud across both Kubernetes and VMs. Prior to 2.7.26, 2.9.16, 2.11.14, 2.12.11, and 2.13.7, Universal mode kuma-dp connections to an HTTPS control plane disable TLS peer verification when --ca-cert-file is not supplied and KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT is unset. The dataplane authentication token is sent over the unverified connection, allowing an on-path attacker to intercept the token, impersonate the control plane, inject a forged bootstrap configuration, and take over the proxy. Standard Kubernetes installations created by kumactl install control-plane or the official Helm chart are unaffected because the mutating admission webhook injects KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT into each sidecar. This issue is fixed in versions 2.7.26, 2.9.16, 2.11.14, 2.12.11, and 2.13.7.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-52724</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-wvmp-6r4v-j6cv — kuma-dp connects to control plane without verifying TLS certificate when no CA is configured</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wvmp-6r4v-j6cv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/kumahq/kuma/v2, Go: github.com/kumahq/kuma&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When kuma-dp is started against an HTTPS control plane and the operator did not pass a CA certificate, the data plane connects with TLS peer verification disabled. The dataplane authentication token is sent over this unverified connection&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An on-path attacker can intercept the dataplane authentication token and impersonate the control plane to the data plane, allowing them to inject a forged bootstrap configuration and take over the proxy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected configurations&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Universal mode `kuma-dp` started against an HTTPS control plane without `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` unset)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Not affected&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Kubernetes installs done through the standard installers (`kumactl install control-plane` or the official Helm chart). In both cases the control plane&amp;#39;s mutating admission webhook injects `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` into every sidecar at pod admission, so each `kuma-dp` starts with the CA already configured&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Set `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT`) on every Universal mode data plane and point it at the control plane&amp;#39;s serving CA. Alternatively, terminate the control plane behind a publicly trusted certificate; the patched releases will verify successfully against the operating system trust store with no further configuration&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Resources&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Fix: https://github.com/kumahq/kuma/pull/16777&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/kumahq/kuma/v2, Go: github.com/kumahq/kuma&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When kuma-dp is started against an HTTPS control plane and the operator did not pass a CA certificate, the data plane connects with TLS peer verification disabled. The dataplane authentication token is sent over this unverified connection&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An on-path attacker can intercept the dataplane authentication token and impersonate the control plane to the data plane, allowing them to inject a forged bootstrap configuration and take over the proxy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected configurations&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Universal mode `kuma-dp` started against an HTTPS control plane without `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` unset)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Not affected&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Kubernetes installs done through the standard installers (`kumactl install control-plane` or the official Helm chart). In both cases the control plane&amp;#39;s mutating admission webhook injects `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT` into every sidecar at pod admission, so each `kuma-dp` starts with the CA already configured&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Set `--ca-cert-file` (or `KUMA_CONTROL_PLANE_CA_CERT`) on every Universal mode data plane and point it at the control plane&amp;#39;s serving CA. Alternatively, terminate the control plane behind a publicly trusted certificate; the patched releases will verify successfully against the operating system trust store with no further configuration&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Resources&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Fix: https://github.com/kumahq/kuma/pull/16777&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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