https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 07 Oct 2026 04:41:34 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-326502 EUVD-2026-326502 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-326502 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-50570 <p>Fission is an open-source, Kubernetes-native serverless framework that simplifies the deployment of functions and applications on Kubernetes. Prior to version 1.25.0, Fission added PodSpec safety validation for tenant-facing Environment and Function CRDs (ValidatePodSpecSafety / ValidateContainerSafety admission webhook + sanitizeContainerSecurityContext executor merge layer), but the capability check was implemented as a fixed denylist of six Linux capabilities (SYS_ADMIN, NET_ADMIN, SYS_PTRACE, SYS_MODULE, DAC_READ_SEARCH, DAC_OVERRIDE). The denylist omitted CAP_SYS_TIME, among others. As a result, a tenant who could create a Function or Environment CRD could request securityContext.capabilities.add: [&#34;SYS_TIME&#34;], pass Fission&#39;s admission validation and merge-layer sanitization, and run attacker-controlled code with CAP_SYS_TIME in the resulting function or runtime container. This issue has been patched in version 1.25.0.</p> <p>Fission is an open-source, Kubernetes-native serverless framework that simplifies the deployment of functions and applications on Kubernetes. Prior to version 1.25.0, Fission added PodSpec safety validation for tenant-facing Environment and Function CRDs (ValidatePodSpecSafety / ValidateContainerSafety admission webhook + sanitizeContainerSecurityContext executor merge layer), but the capability check was implemented as a fixed denylist of six Linux capabilities (SYS_ADMIN, NET_ADMIN, SYS_PTRACE, SYS_MODULE, DAC_READ_SEARCH, DAC_OVERRIDE). The denylist omitted CAP_SYS_TIME, among others. As a result, a tenant who could create a Function or Environment CRD could request securityContext.capabilities.add: [&#34;SYS_TIME&#34;], pass Fission&#39;s admission validation and merge-layer sanitization, and run attacker-controlled code with CAP_SYS_TIME in the resulting function or runtime container. This issue has been patched in version 1.25.0.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-50570 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qf5v-m7p4-95rp <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/fission/fission</p> <p>Fission v1.24.0 added PodSpec safety validation for tenant-facing Environment and Function CRDs (`ValidatePodSpecSafety` / `ValidateContainerSafety` admission webhook + `sanitizeContainerSecurityContext` executor merge layer), but the capability check was implemented as a fixed **denylist of six Linux capabilities** (SYS_ADMIN, NET_ADMIN, SYS_PTRACE, SYS_MODULE, DAC_READ_SEARCH, DAC_OVERRIDE). The denylist omitted **CAP_SYS_TIME**, among others. As a result, a tenant who could create a Function or Environment CRD could request `securityContext.capabilities.add: [&#34;SYS_TIME&#34;]`, pass Fission&#39;s admission validation and merge-layer sanitization, and run attacker-controlled code with `CAP_SYS_TIME` in the resulting function or runtime container.</p> <p>Demonstrated consequence: cross-tenant node integrity damage via `CAP_SYS_TIME`. The Linux real-time clock is not namespaced — time namespaces virtualize only `MONOTONIC` and `BOOTTIME`, never `REALTIME` — so a tenant container holding `CAP_SYS_TIME` could call `clock_settime(CLOCK_REALTIME)` and rewrite the shared node wall clock. That corrupts TLS / certificate validity windows, Kubernetes lease renewal, token expiry, scheduling, and time-series for every workload on the node.</p> <p>The denylist also omitted `SYS_RAWIO`, `BPF`, `SYS_RESOURCE`, and `MAC_ADMIN`. Those are documented as evidence that the denylist is structurally incomplete (their practical impact is kernel-, LSM-, or device-cgroup-dependent and is not exercised in this report).…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/fission/fission</p> <p>Fission v1.24.0 added PodSpec safety validation for tenant-facing Environment and Function CRDs (`ValidatePodSpecSafety` / `ValidateContainerSafety` admission webhook + `sanitizeContainerSecurityContext` executor merge layer), but the capability check was implemented as a fixed **denylist of six Linux capabilities** (SYS_ADMIN, NET_ADMIN, SYS_PTRACE, SYS_MODULE, DAC_READ_SEARCH, DAC_OVERRIDE). The denylist omitted **CAP_SYS_TIME**, among others. As a result, a tenant who could create a Function or Environment CRD could request `securityContext.capabilities.add: [&#34;SYS_TIME&#34;]`, pass Fission&#39;s admission validation and merge-layer sanitization, and run attacker-controlled code with `CAP_SYS_TIME` in the resulting function or runtime container.</p> <p>Demonstrated consequence: cross-tenant node integrity damage via `CAP_SYS_TIME`. The Linux real-time clock is not namespaced — time namespaces virtualize only `MONOTONIC` and `BOOTTIME`, never `REALTIME` — so a tenant container holding `CAP_SYS_TIME` could call `clock_settime(CLOCK_REALTIME)` and rewrite the shared node wall clock. That corrupts TLS / certificate validity windows, Kubernetes lease renewal, token expiry, scheduling, and time-series for every workload on the node.</p> <p>The denylist also omitted `SYS_RAWIO`, `BPF`, `SYS_RESOURCE`, and `MAC_ADMIN`. Those are documented as evidence that the denylist is structurally incomplete (their practical impact is kernel-, LSM-, or device-cgroup-dependent and is not exercised in this report).…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qf5v-m7p4-95rp