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EUVD-2026-363994

fkie_cve-2026-50553

Note Mark is an open-source note-taking application. Prior to version 0.19.5, Note Mark validates book and note slug values with the OpenAPI/huma tag pattern:"[a-z0-9-]+". huma compiles this with regexp.MustCompile(s.Pattern) and tests it with patternRe.MatchString(str), an UNANCHORED match. Because the pattern is not anchored (^...$), any string that merely CONTAINS one [a-z0-9-] substring passes validation. A slug such as ../../../../../../tmp/escape is accepted and stored verbatim. The data-export CLI commands (note-mark migrate export and note-mark migrate export-v1) join these unsanitized slugs straight into the output path with path.Join / filepath.Join, then os.MkdirAll the directory and os.Create the note file. path.Join resolves the ../ segments, so the note content file is written OUTSIDE the configured export directory. The export process commonly runs as root (default in Docker / bare-metal admin usage), so this is a root-privilege arbitrary directory create + file write. This issue has been patched in version 0.19.5.

GHSA-rqrh-8wpv-x7hh — Note Mark: Path traversal via unsanitized book/note slug in migrate export (sibling of GHSA-g49p)

Affected: Go: github.com/enchant97/note-mark/backend

## Summary

Note Mark validates book and note `slug` values with the OpenAPI/huma tag `pattern:"[a-z0-9-]+"`. huma compiles this with `regexp.MustCompile(s.Pattern)` and tests it with `patternRe.MatchString(str)`, an UNANCHORED match. Because the pattern is not anchored (`^...$`), any string that merely CONTAINS one `[a-z0-9-]` substring passes validation. A slug such as `../../../../../../tmp/escape` is accepted and stored verbatim.

The data-export CLI commands (`note-mark migrate export` and `note-mark migrate export-v1`) join these unsanitized slugs straight into the output path with `path.Join` / `filepath.Join`, then `os.MkdirAll` the directory and `os.Create` the note file. `path.Join` resolves the `../` segments, so the note content file is written OUTSIDE the configured export directory. The export process commonly runs as root (default in Docker / bare-metal admin usage), so this is a root-privilege arbitrary directory create + file write.

This is the unguarded sibling of GHSA-g49p-4qxj-88v3 (CVE class CWE-22 in the same export sinks). That fix added `filepath.Base(asset.Name)` to sanitize the asset filename, but the adjacent path components `book.Slug` and `note.Slug` — used in the very same `path.Join` calls in the same two export functions — were left raw, and their input-side `pattern` guard is bypassable as shown above.

## Vulnerable code

Slug input validation (`backend/db/types.go`, v0.19.4):

```go type CreateBook struct { Name string `json:"name" re…