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EUVD-2026-331003

fkie_cve-2026-50137

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.0, an anonymous attacker who knows or can enumerate a workspace id (app_...) and an S3-source datasource id (ds_...) can call this endpoint with no auth and obtain a 15-minute pre-signed PUT URL minted on the victim's IAM identity. The endpoint also returns the publicUrl so the attacker knows exactly where their PUT lands. Because bucket is attacker-controlled, the attacker can write to any bucket those IAM credentials can write to, not only the bucket the datasource was configured for. The Budibase server route POST /api/attachments/:datasourceId/url (packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts) is registered with only the recaptcha middleware. There is no authorized(...) middleware in the chain. The controller (packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts::getSignedUploadURL) looks the requested datasource up, instantiates an AWS S3 client with the datasource's stored accessKeyId / secretAccessKey, and returns an AWS Signature V4 pre-signed PutObjectCommand URL for the caller-supplied bucket and key. The bucket is not pinned to the datasource's configured bucket. The workspace context required by sdk.datasources.get is sourced by getWorkspaceIdFromCtx (packages/backend-core/src/utils/utils.ts) from any of: the x-budibase-app-id header, the JSON body appId, a path segment that begins with the workspace prefix, or ?appId=. auth.buildAuthMiddleware([], { publicAllowed: true }) runs before any of this and explicit…

GHSA-35c4-rvc8-frhm — Budibase: POST /api/attachments/:datasourceId/url is unauthenticated and lets anonymous callers mint S3 PUT pre-signed…

Affected: npm: @budibase/server

## Summary

The Budibase server route `POST /api/attachments/:datasourceId/url` ([`packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts`](https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/blob/56d2a984/packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts)) is registered with **only** the `recaptcha` middleware. There is no `authorized(...)` middleware in the chain. The controller (`packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts::getSignedUploadURL`) looks the requested datasource up, instantiates an AWS S3 client with the datasource's stored `accessKeyId` / `secretAccessKey`, and returns an AWS Signature V4 pre-signed `PutObjectCommand` URL for the caller-supplied `bucket` and `key`. The `bucket` is not pinned to the datasource's configured bucket.

The workspace context required by `sdk.datasources.get` is sourced by `getWorkspaceIdFromCtx` ([`packages/backend-core/src/utils/utils.ts`](https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/blob/56d2a984/packages/backend-core/src/utils/utils.ts)) from any of: the `x-budibase-app-id` header, the JSON body `appId`, a path segment that begins with the workspace prefix, or `?appId=`. `auth.buildAuthMiddleware([], { publicAllowed: true })` runs before any of this and explicitly allows anonymous requests. The `currentWorkspace` middleware's "deny access to dev preview" branch only triggers under `isBrowser(ctx) && !isApiKey(ctx)`; `isBrowser` checks the parsed `User-Agent` for a recognised browser, so any non-browser client (curl, the supplied PoC, any tool not setting a browser…

WID-SEC-W-2026-1714 — Budibase: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen Manipulation von Dateien

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Budibase ausnutzen, um Dateien zu manipulieren.