<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 20:58:35 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-331108</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-331108</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-331108</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-331108</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-50132</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-50132</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.0, `GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff` is a public endpoint (no auth required) that performs a permanent, state-changing operation: it binds an external chat identity (Slack/Discord/MS Teams) to an authenticated Budibase user account, with no consent UI and no CSRF protection. The session token in the URL is created by the attacker (from their own /link slash command) and embeds the attacker&amp;#39;s externalUserId. When an authenticated Budibase victim visits the URL, their account is silently and permanently linked to the attacker&amp;#39;s Slack/Discord identity. The server responds with &amp;#34;Authentication succeeded.&amp;#34; — no indication of what was linked. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.0, `GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff` is a public endpoint (no auth required) that performs a permanent, state-changing operation: it binds an external chat identity (Slack/Discord/MS Teams) to an authenticated Budibase user account, with no consent UI and no CSRF protection. The session token in the URL is created by the attacker (from their own /link slash command) and embeds the attacker&amp;#39;s externalUserId. When an authenticated Budibase victim visits the URL, their account is silently and permanently linked to the attacker&amp;#39;s Slack/Discord identity. The server responds with &amp;#34;Authentication succeeded.&amp;#34; — no indication of what was linked. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-50132</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-v7j5-vc4m-723w — Budibase has an Account Impersonation Issue — Chat Identity Link Hijacking via Missing Consent &amp; CSRF</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-v7j5-vc4m-723w</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @budibase/server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Title&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Chat Identity Link Hijacking — Attacker Can Silently Map Their Slack/Discord Identity to Any Authenticated Budibase User&amp;#39;s Account**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Severity&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**High** — CVSS 3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N = **7.3**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Product&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Product:** Budibase
- **Version:** 3.37.2 (introduced in this version)
- **Component:** `packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts`
- **Endpoint:** `GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerability Type&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery
- CWE-284: Improper Access Control&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerability Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff` is a **public endpoint** (no auth required) that performs a permanent, state-changing operation: it binds an external chat identity (Slack/Discord/MS Teams) to an authenticated Budibase user account, with **no consent UI and no CSRF protection**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The session token in the URL is created **by the attacker** (from their own `/link` slash command) and embeds **the attacker&amp;#39;s `externalUserId`**. When an authenticated Budibase victim visits the URL, their account is silently and permanently linked to the attacker&amp;#39;s Slack/Discord identity. The server responds with `&amp;#34;Authentication succeeded.&amp;#34;` — no indication of what was linked.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Route Registration&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```typescript
// packages/server/src/api/routes/chat.ts:22
router.get(
  &amp;#34;/api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff&amp;#34;,
  controller.handoffChatLinkSession   // registered in publicRoutes — zero auth…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @budibase/server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Title&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Chat Identity Link Hijacking — Attacker Can Silently Map Their Slack/Discord Identity to Any Authenticated Budibase User&amp;#39;s Account**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Severity&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**High** — CVSS 3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N = **7.3**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Product&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Product:** Budibase
- **Version:** 3.37.2 (introduced in this version)
- **Component:** `packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts`
- **Endpoint:** `GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerability Type&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery
- CWE-284: Improper Access Control&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerability Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff` is a **public endpoint** (no auth required) that performs a permanent, state-changing operation: it binds an external chat identity (Slack/Discord/MS Teams) to an authenticated Budibase user account, with **no consent UI and no CSRF protection**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The session token in the URL is created **by the attacker** (from their own `/link` slash command) and embeds **the attacker&amp;#39;s `externalUserId`**. When an authenticated Budibase victim visits the URL, their account is silently and permanently linked to the attacker&amp;#39;s Slack/Discord identity. The server responds with `&amp;#34;Authentication succeeded.&amp;#34;` — no indication of what was linked.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Route Registration&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```typescript
// packages/server/src/api/routes/chat.ts:22
router.get(
  &amp;#34;/api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff&amp;#34;,
  controller.handoffChatLinkSession   // registered in publicRoutes — zero auth…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-v7j5-vc4m-723w</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2033 — Budibase: Schwachstelle ermöglicht Manipulation von Daten</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2033</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in Budibase ausnutzen, um Daten zu manipulieren.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in Budibase ausnutzen, um Daten zu manipulieren.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2033</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
