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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-368193</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-368193</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-368193</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-368193</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-50018</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-50018</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Hoverfly is an open source API simulation tool. Prior to version 1.12.8, remote post-serve actions use `http.DefaultClient` without any timeout configuration. When the remote endpoint is unreachable or intentionally slow (accepts TCP connection but never responds), each triggered proxy request spawns a goroutine that blocks indefinitely on `http.DefaultClient.Do()`. An attacker can cause unbounded goroutine accumulation leading to memory exhaustion and process crash (OOM kill). Unlike local post-serve action execution, this requires no binary execution, only a URL pointing to a non-responsive endpoint. Version 1.12.8 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Hoverfly is an open source API simulation tool. Prior to version 1.12.8, remote post-serve actions use `http.DefaultClient` without any timeout configuration. When the remote endpoint is unreachable or intentionally slow (accepts TCP connection but never responds), each triggered proxy request spawns a goroutine that blocks indefinitely on `http.DefaultClient.Do()`. An attacker can cause unbounded goroutine accumulation leading to memory exhaustion and process crash (OOM kill). Unlike local post-serve action execution, this requires no binary execution, only a URL pointing to a non-responsive endpoint. Version 1.12.8 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-50018</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-42j2-w334-qxw7 — Hoverfly: Denial of Service via Goroutine Leak in Remote Post-Serve Actions</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-42j2-w334-qxw7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/SpectoLabs/hoverfly&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Remote post-serve actions use `http.DefaultClient` without any timeout configuration. When the remote endpoint is unreachable or intentionally slow (accepts TCP connection but never responds), each triggered proxy request spawns a goroutine that blocks indefinitely on `http.DefaultClient.Do()`. An attacker can cause unbounded goroutine accumulation leading to memory exhaustion and process crash (OOM kill). Unlike local post-serve action execution, this requires no binary execution, only a URL pointing to a non-responsive endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. Remote actions executed in goroutines without timeout (`core/hoverfly.go:224-228`):**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
go postServeAction.Execute(result.Pair, journalIDChannel, hf.Journal)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Post-serve actions are executed in separate goroutines with no recovery wrapper.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**2. HTTP client has no timeout (`core/action/action.go:128-143`):**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
req, err := http.NewRequest(&amp;#34;POST&amp;#34;, action.Remote, bytes.NewBuffer(pairViewBytes))
// ...
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)  // No timeout! Blocks forever.
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`http.DefaultClient` has zero timeout by default in Go. If the remote server:
- Accepts the TCP connection but never sends a response
- Establishes TLS but never completes the handshake  
- Uses TCP window size 0 (flow control stall)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;...the goroutine blocks indefinitely. There is no context cancellation, no deadline, and no cleanup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**3. No goroutine limit or backpressure:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no limit on how many post-serve action gorout…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/SpectoLabs/hoverfly&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Remote post-serve actions use `http.DefaultClient` without any timeout configuration. When the remote endpoint is unreachable or intentionally slow (accepts TCP connection but never responds), each triggered proxy request spawns a goroutine that blocks indefinitely on `http.DefaultClient.Do()`. An attacker can cause unbounded goroutine accumulation leading to memory exhaustion and process crash (OOM kill). Unlike local post-serve action execution, this requires no binary execution, only a URL pointing to a non-responsive endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. Remote actions executed in goroutines without timeout (`core/hoverfly.go:224-228`):**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
go postServeAction.Execute(result.Pair, journalIDChannel, hf.Journal)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Post-serve actions are executed in separate goroutines with no recovery wrapper.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**2. HTTP client has no timeout (`core/action/action.go:128-143`):**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
req, err := http.NewRequest(&amp;#34;POST&amp;#34;, action.Remote, bytes.NewBuffer(pairViewBytes))
// ...
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)  // No timeout! Blocks forever.
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`http.DefaultClient` has zero timeout by default in Go. If the remote server:
- Accepts the TCP connection but never sends a response
- Establishes TLS but never completes the handshake  
- Uses TCP window size 0 (flow control stall)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;...the goroutine blocks indefinitely. There is no context cancellation, no deadline, and no cleanup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**3. No goroutine limit or backpressure:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no limit on how many post-serve action gorout…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-42j2-w334-qxw7</guid>
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