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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-367985</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-367985</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-367985</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-367985</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-49992</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49992</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Kimai is an open-source time tracking application. Versions prior to 2.58.0 contain authenticated cross-site request forgery issues in their default team creation shortcuts for projects, customers, and activities. These endpoints are exposed through `GET` routes and directly create or reuse a `Team`, add the current user as teamlead, and bind the target object to that team. As a result, an attacker can trick a logged-in user with the required permissions into visiting a malicious page and cause unauthorized changes to team, teamlead, and object-binding relationships. This is a real authorization-structure modification issue rather than a harmless UI shortcut. Version 2.58.0 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Kimai is an open-source time tracking application. Versions prior to 2.58.0 contain authenticated cross-site request forgery issues in their default team creation shortcuts for projects, customers, and activities. These endpoints are exposed through `GET` routes and directly create or reuse a `Team`, add the current user as teamlead, and bind the target object to that team. As a result, an attacker can trick a logged-in user with the required permissions into visiting a malicious page and cause unauthorized changes to team, teamlead, and object-binding relationships. This is a real authorization-structure modification issue rather than a harmless UI shortcut. Version 2.58.0 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49992</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-pgcc-vfmc-7cw5 — Kimai: Login CSRF in Default Team Creation Endpoints Allows Unauthorized Team and Permission Structure Changes</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pgcc-vfmc-7cw5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: kimai/kimai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Kimai 2.56.0 contains authenticated cross-site request forgery issues in its default team creation shortcuts for projects, customers, and activities. These endpoints are exposed through `GET` routes and directly create or reuse a `Team`, add the current user as teamlead, and bind the target object to that team.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, an attacker can trick a logged-in user with the required permissions into visiting a malicious page and cause unauthorized changes to team, teamlead, and object-binding relationships. This is a real authorization-structure modification issue rather than a harmless UI shortcut.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue affects at least the following routes:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `GET /en/admin/project/{id}/create_team`
- `GET /en/admin/customer/{id}/create_team`
- `GET /en/admin/activity/{id}/create_team`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Each of these routes is a `GET` endpoint, yet each performs persistent writes that alter authorization structure:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- create or reuse a `Team`
- add the current user as `teamlead`
- bind the target `Project`, `Customer`, or `Activity` to that team&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*A PoC was provided, but removed for security reasons.*&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability allows an attacker to remotely alter permission topology while the victim is logged in. A successful exploit can create or reuse a team, assign the victim as its teamlead, and bind a project, customer, or activity to that team without intentional user action.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The pre-requisite is, that the logged-in user already has access to manage permissions o…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: kimai/kimai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Kimai 2.56.0 contains authenticated cross-site request forgery issues in its default team creation shortcuts for projects, customers, and activities. These endpoints are exposed through `GET` routes and directly create or reuse a `Team`, add the current user as teamlead, and bind the target object to that team.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, an attacker can trick a logged-in user with the required permissions into visiting a malicious page and cause unauthorized changes to team, teamlead, and object-binding relationships. This is a real authorization-structure modification issue rather than a harmless UI shortcut.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue affects at least the following routes:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `GET /en/admin/project/{id}/create_team`
- `GET /en/admin/customer/{id}/create_team`
- `GET /en/admin/activity/{id}/create_team`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Each of these routes is a `GET` endpoint, yet each performs persistent writes that alter authorization structure:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- create or reuse a `Team`
- add the current user as `teamlead`
- bind the target `Project`, `Customer`, or `Activity` to that team&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*A PoC was provided, but removed for security reasons.*&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability allows an attacker to remotely alter permission topology while the victim is logged in. A successful exploit can create or reuse a team, assign the victim as its teamlead, and bind a project, customer, or activity to that team without intentional user action.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The pre-requisite is, that the logged-in user already has access to manage permissions o…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pgcc-vfmc-7cw5</guid>
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