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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 08:41:34 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-329664</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329664</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-329664</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329664</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-49983</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49983</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Deno is a JavaScript, TypeScript, and WebAssembly runtime. Prior to 2.8.1, environment access is gated by the env permission. You can deny it with --deny-env, or restrict it to a specific allowlist with --allow-env=FOO,BAR. The expectation is that a program running without env permission cannot change process.env. process.loadEnvFile() (the Node-compatible API for loading variables from a .env file) does not honor this. It only checks that the program has read permission for the dotenv file, then writes every key in that file into the process environment — even when env access is denied. In effect, --allow-read plus a writable or attacker-controlled .env file is enough to defeat --deny-env. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Deno is a JavaScript, TypeScript, and WebAssembly runtime. Prior to 2.8.1, environment access is gated by the env permission. You can deny it with --deny-env, or restrict it to a specific allowlist with --allow-env=FOO,BAR. The expectation is that a program running without env permission cannot change process.env. process.loadEnvFile() (the Node-compatible API for loading variables from a .env file) does not honor this. It only checks that the program has read permission for the dotenv file, then writes every key in that file into the process environment — even when env access is denied. In effect, --allow-read plus a writable or attacker-controlled .env file is enough to defeat --deny-env. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49983</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-4c8g-jvcx-v4hv — Deno: process.loadEnvFile() bypasses env permission checks and mutates process.env with only read access</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4c8g-jvcx-v4hv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: deno&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In Deno, environment access is gated by the `env` permission. You can deny it
with `--deny-env`, or restrict it to a specific allowlist with
`--allow-env=FOO,BAR`. The expectation is that a program running without `env`
permission cannot change `process.env`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`process.loadEnvFile()` (the Node-compatible API for loading variables from a
`.env` file) does **not** honor this. It only checks that the program has
**read** permission for the dotenv file, then writes every key in that file
into the process environment — even when `env` access is denied.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In effect, **`--allow-read` plus a writable or attacker-controlled `.env` file
is enough to defeat `--deny-env`.**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Am I affected?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;You are potentially affected if **all** of the following are true:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. You run Deno **v2.3.0 or newer**.
2. Your program (or any dependency it imports) calls `process.loadEnvFile()`
   from `node:process`.
3. You rely on Deno&amp;#39;s permission model — specifically `--deny-env`, an
   `--allow-env=…` allowlist, or running without granting `env` — as a
   security boundary.
4. The `.env` path passed to `loadEnvFile()` can be controlled or modified by
   a less-trusted party (untrusted input, user-writable directory, third-party
   dependency, etc.) and is covered by your `--allow-read` grant.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If your program does not use `process.loadEnvFile()` at all, or if it already
grants full `env` access, this advisory does not change your risk.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: deno&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In Deno, environment access is gated by the `env` permission. You can deny it
with `--deny-env`, or restrict it to a specific allowlist with
`--allow-env=FOO,BAR`. The expectation is that a program running without `env`
permission cannot change `process.env`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`process.loadEnvFile()` (the Node-compatible API for loading variables from a
`.env` file) does **not** honor this. It only checks that the program has
**read** permission for the dotenv file, then writes every key in that file
into the process environment — even when `env` access is denied.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In effect, **`--allow-read` plus a writable or attacker-controlled `.env` file
is enough to defeat `--deny-env`.**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Am I affected?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;You are potentially affected if **all** of the following are true:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. You run Deno **v2.3.0 or newer**.
2. Your program (or any dependency it imports) calls `process.loadEnvFile()`
   from `node:process`.
3. You rely on Deno&amp;#39;s permission model — specifically `--deny-env`, an
   `--allow-env=…` allowlist, or running without granting `env` — as a
   security boundary.
4. The `.env` path passed to `loadEnvFile()` can be controlled or modified by
   a less-trusted party (untrusted input, user-writable directory, third-party
   dependency, etc.) and is covered by your `--allow-read` grant.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If your program does not use `process.loadEnvFile()` at all, or if it already
grants full `env` access, this advisory does not change your risk.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4c8g-jvcx-v4hv</guid>
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