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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 14:38:36 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-329846</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329846</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-329846</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329846</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-49859</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49859</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Deno is a JavaScript, TypeScript, and WebAssembly runtime. Prior to 2.8.1, when fetch() was called, Deno checked the destination hostname against --deny-net rules but did not re-check the IP addresses that hostname resolved to. An attacker-controlled script could use a specially crafted domain name that passes the hostname check yet resolves to a denied IP, bypassing the network restriction entirely. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Deno is a JavaScript, TypeScript, and WebAssembly runtime. Prior to 2.8.1, when fetch() was called, Deno checked the destination hostname against --deny-net rules but did not re-check the IP addresses that hostname resolved to. An attacker-controlled script could use a specially crafted domain name that passes the hostname check yet resolves to a denied IP, bypassing the network restriction entirely. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49859</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-cpgj-f7g3-2pp2 — Deno: `fetch()` API sandbox bypass via missing DNS resolution check</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cpgj-f7g3-2pp2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: deno&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `fetch()` was called, Deno checked the destination hostname against
`--deny-net` rules but did not re-check the IP addresses that hostname
resolved to. An attacker-controlled script could use a specially crafted domain
name that passes the hostname check yet resolves to a denied IP, bypassing the
network restriction entirely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Code running under `--deny-net` could reach hosts that the user intended to
block. In practice this means network isolation rules — for example, blocking
access to `localhost` or internal services — could be silently circumvented by
a malicious or compromised dependency.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A companion advisory covers the same class of issue in the WebSocket API.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Who is affected&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users who:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- run untrusted or third-party code with `deno run`, and
- rely on `--deny-net` to restrict which hosts that code can reach.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If you do not use `--deny-net`, or if you only run fully trusted code, you are
not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workaround&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No workaround is available short of upgrading. If upgrading immediately is not
possible, avoid granting `--allow-net` to untrusted code that also has
`--deny-net` restrictions you depend on for security.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `fetch()` DNS resolver now performs a post-resolution check on every IP
address before passing it to the HTTP connector, consistent with how
`Deno.connect` already behaved.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: deno&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `fetch()` was called, Deno checked the destination hostname against
`--deny-net` rules but did not re-check the IP addresses that hostname
resolved to. An attacker-controlled script could use a specially crafted domain
name that passes the hostname check yet resolves to a denied IP, bypassing the
network restriction entirely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Code running under `--deny-net` could reach hosts that the user intended to
block. In practice this means network isolation rules — for example, blocking
access to `localhost` or internal services — could be silently circumvented by
a malicious or compromised dependency.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A companion advisory covers the same class of issue in the WebSocket API.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Who is affected&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users who:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- run untrusted or third-party code with `deno run`, and
- rely on `--deny-net` to restrict which hosts that code can reach.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If you do not use `--deny-net`, or if you only run fully trusted code, you are
not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workaround&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No workaround is available short of upgrading. If upgrading immediately is not
possible, avoid granting `--allow-net` to untrusted code that also has
`--deny-net` restrictions you depend on for security.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `fetch()` DNS resolver now performs a post-resolution check on every IP
address before passing it to the HTTP connector, consistent with how
`Deno.connect` already behaved.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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