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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 07:32:03 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-330760</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330760</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-330760</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330760</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-49411</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49411</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Deno is a JavaScript, TypeScript, and WebAssembly runtime. Prior to 2.8.0, the Node.js compatibility TCP path checked the permission against the original hostname string before resolution and then did not re-check after resolution. A caller could therefore pass a numeric alias of an IP address (for example the decimal integer 2130706433 or the hex form 0x7f000001, both of which resolve to 127.0.0.1) and reach the denied destination through node:net.connect or node:http.request&amp;#39;s { host, port } options form. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Deno is a JavaScript, TypeScript, and WebAssembly runtime. Prior to 2.8.0, the Node.js compatibility TCP path checked the permission against the original hostname string before resolution and then did not re-check after resolution. A caller could therefore pass a numeric alias of an IP address (for example the decimal integer 2130706433 or the hex form 0x7f000001, both of which resolve to 127.0.0.1) and reach the denied destination through node:net.connect or node:http.request&amp;#39;s { host, port } options form. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49411</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-v8fw-85r8-5m23 — Deno: Node TCPWrap numeric hostname aliases bypass --deny-net resolved-IP deny checks</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-v8fw-85r8-5m23</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: deno&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Deno&amp;#39;s network permission model is designed so that `--deny-net` rules apply to the **resolved IP address** of a destination, not just the literal string supplied by the caller. That means `--deny-net=127.0.0.1` (or `--deny-net=127.0.0.0/8`) is expected to block any attempt to reach loopback, regardless of how the hostname is spelled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On affected versions, the Node.js compatibility TCP path checked the permission against the **original hostname string** before resolution and then did not re-check after resolution. A caller could therefore pass a numeric alias of an IP address (for example the decimal integer `2130706433` or the hex form `0x7f000001`, both of which resolve to `127.0.0.1`) and reach the denied destination through `node:net.connect` or `node:http.request`&amp;#39;s `{ host, port }` options form.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The native `Deno.connect()`, `fetch()`, and URL-string variants of `node:http.request(&amp;#34;http://...&amp;#34;)` were not affected, because they either re-checked permissions after resolution or normalized the hostname through the URL parser before checking.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Proof of concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Run on Deno `2.7.14`, with a local TCP listener on `127.0.0.1:&amp;lt;PORT&amp;gt;`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
import net from &amp;#34;node:net&amp;#34;;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// --allow-net + --deny-net=127.0.0.0/8
// (or even --deny-net=127.0.0.1:&amp;lt;PORT&amp;gt;)
net.connect({ host: &amp;#34;2130706433&amp;#34;, port: PORT });     // CONNECTED ❌
net.connect({ host: &amp;#34;0x7f000001&amp;#34;, port: PORT });     // CONNECTED ❌
net.connect({ host: &amp;#34;127.0.0.1&amp;#34;,  port: PORT });     // denied ✅
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: deno&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Deno&amp;#39;s network permission model is designed so that `--deny-net` rules apply to the **resolved IP address** of a destination, not just the literal string supplied by the caller. That means `--deny-net=127.0.0.1` (or `--deny-net=127.0.0.0/8`) is expected to block any attempt to reach loopback, regardless of how the hostname is spelled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On affected versions, the Node.js compatibility TCP path checked the permission against the **original hostname string** before resolution and then did not re-check after resolution. A caller could therefore pass a numeric alias of an IP address (for example the decimal integer `2130706433` or the hex form `0x7f000001`, both of which resolve to `127.0.0.1`) and reach the denied destination through `node:net.connect` or `node:http.request`&amp;#39;s `{ host, port }` options form.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The native `Deno.connect()`, `fetch()`, and URL-string variants of `node:http.request(&amp;#34;http://...&amp;#34;)` were not affected, because they either re-checked permissions after resolution or normalized the hostname through the URL parser before checking.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Proof of concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Run on Deno `2.7.14`, with a local TCP listener on `127.0.0.1:&amp;lt;PORT&amp;gt;`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
import net from &amp;#34;node:net&amp;#34;;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// --allow-net + --deny-net=127.0.0.0/8
// (or even --deny-net=127.0.0.1:&amp;lt;PORT&amp;gt;)
net.connect({ host: &amp;#34;2130706433&amp;#34;, port: PORT });     // CONNECTED ❌
net.connect({ host: &amp;#34;0x7f000001&amp;#34;, port: PORT });     // CONNECTED ❌
net.connect({ host: &amp;#34;127.0.0.1&amp;#34;,  port: PORT });     // denied ✅
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-v8fw-85r8-5m23</guid>
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