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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 01:39:08 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-330063</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330063</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-330063</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330063</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-49402</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49402</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Deno is a JavaScript, TypeScript, and WebAssembly runtime. Prior to 2.7.10, Deno&amp;#39;s node:child_process implementation provided an escapeShellArg() helper used when callers passed shell: true to spawn / spawnSync / exec and friends. On Windows, the helper failed to quote arguments that contained cmd.exe metacharacters and did not neutralize % (which cmd.exe expands even inside double-quoted strings). An attacker who controlled any portion of an argument passed to such a call could inject arbitrary additional commands into the spawned cmd.exe invocation. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.7.10.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Deno is a JavaScript, TypeScript, and WebAssembly runtime. Prior to 2.7.10, Deno&amp;#39;s node:child_process implementation provided an escapeShellArg() helper used when callers passed shell: true to spawn / spawnSync / exec and friends. On Windows, the helper failed to quote arguments that contained cmd.exe metacharacters and did not neutralize % (which cmd.exe expands even inside double-quoted strings). An attacker who controlled any portion of an argument passed to such a call could inject arbitrary additional commands into the spawned cmd.exe invocation. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.7.10.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49402</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-7xh3-mhg9-jcw8 — Deno: Command Injection via spawnSync &amp; spawn on Windows</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7xh3-mhg9-jcw8</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: deno&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Deno&amp;#39;s `node:child_process` implementation provided an `escapeShellArg()` helper used when callers passed `shell: true` to `spawn` / `spawnSync` / `exec` and friends. On Windows, the helper failed to quote arguments that contained `cmd.exe` metacharacters such as `&amp;amp;`, `|`, `&amp;lt;`, `&amp;gt;`, `^`, `!`, `(`, `)`, and did not neutralize `%` (which `cmd.exe` expands even inside double-quoted strings). An attacker who controlled any portion of an argument passed to such a call could inject arbitrary additional commands into the spawned `cmd.exe` invocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This was the Windows counterpart to CVE-2026-27190, which fixed the same class of bug in the Unix branch of `escapeShellArg`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On Windows, `child_process` with `shell: true` ran the command via `cmd.exe /d /s /c &amp;#34;&amp;lt;command line&amp;gt;&amp;#34;`. Deno assembled that command line by joining the program name and each argument through `escapeShellArg()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable check was:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
// If no special characters, return as-is
if (!/[\s&amp;#34;\\]/.test(arg)) {
  return arg;
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The regex covered only whitespace, double-quote, and backslash. Any argument containing `cmd.exe`-significant characters but none of those three was returned unquoted and therefore interpreted by the shell. The most straightforward exploit chained commands with `&amp;amp;`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
import { spawnSync } from &amp;#34;node:child_process&amp;#34;;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;spawnSync(&amp;#34;echo&amp;#34;, [&amp;#34;test&amp;amp;calc.exe&amp;#34;], { shell: true, encoding: &amp;#34;utf-8&amp;#34; });
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The reporter confirmed this launched `calc.exe` on Windows…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: deno&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Deno&amp;#39;s `node:child_process` implementation provided an `escapeShellArg()` helper used when callers passed `shell: true` to `spawn` / `spawnSync` / `exec` and friends. On Windows, the helper failed to quote arguments that contained `cmd.exe` metacharacters such as `&amp;amp;`, `|`, `&amp;lt;`, `&amp;gt;`, `^`, `!`, `(`, `)`, and did not neutralize `%` (which `cmd.exe` expands even inside double-quoted strings). An attacker who controlled any portion of an argument passed to such a call could inject arbitrary additional commands into the spawned `cmd.exe` invocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This was the Windows counterpart to CVE-2026-27190, which fixed the same class of bug in the Unix branch of `escapeShellArg`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On Windows, `child_process` with `shell: true` ran the command via `cmd.exe /d /s /c &amp;#34;&amp;lt;command line&amp;gt;&amp;#34;`. Deno assembled that command line by joining the program name and each argument through `escapeShellArg()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable check was:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
// If no special characters, return as-is
if (!/[\s&amp;#34;\\]/.test(arg)) {
  return arg;
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The regex covered only whitespace, double-quote, and backslash. Any argument containing `cmd.exe`-significant characters but none of those three was returned unquoted and therefore interpreted by the shell. The most straightforward exploit chained commands with `&amp;amp;`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
import { spawnSync } from &amp;#34;node:child_process&amp;#34;;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;spawnSync(&amp;#34;echo&amp;#34;, [&amp;#34;test&amp;amp;calc.exe&amp;#34;], { shell: true, encoding: &amp;#34;utf-8&amp;#34; });
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The reporter confirmed this launched `calc.exe` on Windows…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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